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Executive summary
After a decade of transition, there is still no consensus among economists as to what the
most appropriate recipe is to place the transition countries onto a path of sustainable economic
growth. As a step towards achieving a better reform paradigm for transition, we first need to
have a systematic understanding of the various paths the transition countries have taken over the
transition period. Developing a set of economic indicators to provide such an understanding is
the central task of this paper. In doing so the paper reveals various patterns of transition and the
factors influencing them, placing the experience of transition in perspective. The approach places
a heavy emphasis on the use of both the now massive amount of existing data on transition as
well as new survey data specially collected from the 25 transition countries for this purpose.
The paper begins by presenting a framework for evaluating transition. The framework
identifies categories of influences or “determinants of transition” and how they interact to pro-
duce short-term impacts, intermediate outcomes, and long-term socio-economic performance.
Among the determinants are the so-called “initial conditions” of transition. The paper then uses
the initial conditions to create a country cluster typology, which is used throughout the rest of the
paper. Focusing on the “cluster” as the central unit of analysis allows us to control specifically
for commonalties in the initial conditions, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the alternative pol-
icies that countries have taken within the cluster. We believe that a cluster-based analysis is a
more productive approach upon which to formulate donor programs.
Besides the initial conditions, there are six additional determinants of transition that
together explain the transition paths taken over the decade and for which we develop indicators.
These include policies, institutions, government objectives, donor assistance, economic funda-
mentals, and exogenous “shocks”. The policy and institutional (including regulatory, legal, and
economic institutions) reform determinants include the USAID programmatic reform assistance
areas (enterprise restructuring and privatization, land privatization, capital market functionality,
banking sector effectiveness, trade liberalization, SME promotion, corporate governance/busi-
ness standards, and tax administration). The objectives of the government is an important
determinant not just because governments are the direct recipients of donor aid and ultimately
must spearhead reform, but because the transition process is a transformation of government as
well as markets. Furthermore, it is impossible to evaluate the quality and performance of reform
without taking into account the intentions of those directing and implementing the process itself.
The paper presents the patterns of these determinants from the point of view of donor priorities
and allocations according to the USAID programmatic reform assistance areas above. Economic
fundamentals indicate how well the private sector has responded to the economic environment
created by government. The stress here is not only on performance per se but on economic
variables that affect performance such as levels of private investment, stock market
capitalization, and the economy’s openness.
In order for USAID to track its contribution to improved country performance, it needs to
evaluate first its impact on reforms and second the impact of reform on country performance.
Toward this end, we develop measures of the progress of reforms in USAID programmatic areas
as well as measures of economic performance that we later use in the companion paper.
The first set of indicators measures depth of privatization. This recognizes that “true” pri-
vatization is more than purely a change in title (ownership). It must include considerations of
“agency” issues (ability of shareholders to monitor and exert effective control over manage-
ment), the “hardness” of the firm’s budget constraint, and the nature of the firm’s objective func-
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tion (for example, are they maximizing employment or profits?). Each of these elements is cap-
tured as a sub-indicator as well as being aggregated into a principal reform measure.
The second set of indicators measures progress-in-transition. The aggregate indicator of
this set is a comprehensive measure of the progress in reform performance. The indicator is built
up from sub-indicators measuring the success of reforms in the USAID programming areas
mentioned above. We present how the transition countries have evolved over time according to
this indicator and its sub-indicators. This offers a means to USAID to track its reform progress
across countries and through time. The sub-indicators and, in most cases, their sub-sub-indicators
help us to identify cluster and country weaknesses – and strengths – to be taken into account in
the design of technical assistance programs.
The third set of indicators focuses on country economic performance. They examine per-
formance from several levels, including micro, mezzo, and macro dimensions. Here we capture
such aspects as export performance, foreign direct investment, productive efficiency, and macro
performance.
In summary, by highlighting the differences between and within clusters of transition
countries according to these constructed measures, the paper helps both to identify country pro-
gress in reform made to date as well as areas suitable for targeting additional donor assistance.
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1 Introduction
Transition is now a decade old. Over this period – and for the first time in history – 25 countries
in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) faced the challenge of wholesale
economic reorientation from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy – and
an abrupt reintegration into the world trading regime. Yet while early lessons abound (Balcero-
wicz 1993) there is still no consensus among economists as to what the most appropriate recipe
is to place these economies onto a path of sustainable economic growth and with the lowest
short-run (human) cost. As a step in this direction, we first need to have a systematic
understanding of the various paths the transition countries have taken over this period.
Developing a set of economic indicators to provide such an understanding is the central task of
this paper.
Any recent reading of the literature on countries in transition (e.g., Kolodko 1998) sug-
gests that the initial obsession with macro stabilization and structural adjustment among decision
makers and advisors alike has given way to a focus on a third ingredient: the so called “systemic
transformation” (Sachs 1996; Kornai 1994; Aslund 1994). This paper develops a heuristic
framework to help understand the transition paths taken during the first decade of this systemic
transformation. In doing so it reveals various patterns of transition and the factors influencing
them, placing the experience of transition in perspective. The approach places a heavy emphasis
on the use and analysis of both the now massive amount of existing data on transition as well as
new survey data specially collected from the 25 transition countries1 for this purpose.
As the first of a three-volume study,2 Systemic Transformation in Transition Economies,
the paper lays the groundwork for a large policy research project that the Harvard Institute for
International Development (HIID) carried out for the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). The goal of the study was to evaluate the privatization and economic
restructuring experience of countries in transition and to make recommendations on how USAID
might improve the impact of its assistance to these countries. Of particular concern to USAID
was the role of competitiveness and international integration in achieving sustainable economic
transition as well as how donor assistance can support these. In addition to the present volume,
Volume II of the study focuses on transition country international competitiveness while Volume
III econometrically analyzes the policy and institutional pre-conditions for privatization to
produce economic performance gains at the country level.
The paper begins by presenting a framework for evaluating transition. The framework
identifies categories of influences or “determinants of transition” and how they interact to pro-
duce short-term impacts, intermediate outcomes, and long-term socio-economic performance.
Among the determinants are the so-called “initial conditions” of transition. The initial conditions
describe the situation a country finds itself at the start of the process and are a mixture of geo-
graphic fixed characteristics, hard-to-change institutional and economic conditions, and rela-
tively easy-to-change policy conditions. The paper then uses the initial conditions to create a
country cluster typology, which is used throughout the rest of the paper. Focusing on the “clus-
ter” as the central unit of analysis underscores our belief that this method greatly simplifies the
analysis while at the same time illuminating common features that would otherwise be obscured
by country-specific details. This approach also recognizes that the inter-cluster differences are so
profound as to make it senseless to compare, say capital market developments in Poland with the
                                                
1 These include all transition countries with the exception of China, Mongolia, Vietnam and Bosnia Herzegovina.
2 The full three-volume study is Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat (2000).
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Kyrgyz Republic; their initial conditions are just too different. While it is difficult to draw
lessons between countries in different clusters, the opposite is true within clusters. By
specifically controlling for common initial conditions among countries within a cluster we find
ourselves with a powerful assessment tool to evaluate the effectiveness of the alternative policies
that countries have taken within the cluster. In brief, a cluster-based analysis is a more produc-
tive approach upon which to formulate donor programs.
Besides the initial conditions, there are six additional determinants of transition that
together explain the transition paths taken over the decade. These include government objectives,
policies, institutions, donor assistance, economic fundamentals, and exogenous “shocks”. The
objectives of the government are important not just because governments are the direct recipients
of donor aid but because the transition process is a transformation of government as well as
markets. Furthermore, it is impossible to evaluate the quality and performance of reform without
taking into account the intentions of those directing and implementing the process itself. The
policy and institutional (including regulatory, legal, and economic institutions) reform deter-
minants include the USAID programmatic reform assistance areas (enterprise restructuring and
privatization, land privatization, capital market functionality, banking sector effectiveness, trade
liberalization, SME promotion, corporate governance/business standards, and tax administra-
tion). The present paper presents the patterns of this critical determinant from the point of view
of donor priorities and allocations. Economic fundamentals indicate how well the private sector
has responded to the economic environment created by government. The stress here is not only
on  performance per se but on economic variables that affect performance such as levels of
private investment, stock market capitalization, and the economy’s openness. Finally, there are
“exogenous shocks” – matters beyond anyone’s control – that affect the process and timing of
transition. Examples include war and social conflicts, international factors such as European
Union accession opportunities, earthquakes, or discoveries of mineral wealth.
In order for USAID to track its contribution to improved country performance, it needs to
evaluate first its impact on reforms and second the impact of reform on country performance.
Toward this end, we develop measures of the progress of reforms as well as measures of
economic performance that we use in the companion paper to test the effectiveness of the former
on the latter.
The first set of indicators measures depth of privatization. This recognizes that “true”
privatization is more than purely a change in title (ownership). It must include considerations of
“agency” issues (ability of shareholders to monitor and exert effective control over
management), the “hardness” of the firm’s budget constraint, and the nature of the firm’s
objective function (for example, are they maximizing employment or profits?). Each of these
elements is captured as a sub-indicator as well as being aggregated into a principal reform
measure.
The second set of indicators measures progress-in-transition. The aggregate indicator of
this set is a comprehensive measure of the progress in reform performance. The indicator is built
up from sub-indicators measuring the success of reforms in the USAID programming areas
mentioned above. We present how the transition countries have shifted in rank over time
according to these indicators and their sub-indicators. This offers a means to USAID to track its
reform progress across countries and through time. The sub-indicators and, in most cases, their
sub-sub-indicators help us to identify cluster and country weaknesses – and strengths – to be
taken into account in the design of technical assistance programs.
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The third set of indicators focuses on country economic performance. They examine per-
formance from several levels, including micro, mezzo, and macro dimensions. Here we capture
such aspects as export performance, foreign direct investment, productive efficiency and macro
performance.
Prior to presenting project conclusions, a number of caveats should be made. First and
foremost, this is “big-picture” research related to where countries stand and the central issues on
how donors can make privatization and related reforms more effective. We do not use firm-level,
household, or labor sector micro data sets; we do not carry out comprehensive, country-specific,
needs assessments nor generate country-specific reform priorities; we do not design the compon-
ents for a technical assistance programming exercise. Second, while our work is based on a
specially constructed database of over 400 country panel variables, including those from a 25-
country, 100-question competitiveness survey administered as part of the project, the data are far
from perfect. There are two aspects to this problem. One pertains to each country separately and
there is great variation – from the comprehensive to the sparse – on how much information is
collected, both by the governments themselves as well as by (foreign and domestic) private
organizations. The other pertains to the consistency of data across countries, since it is hard to do
cross-country analysis – even with high quality data – if data definitions are different in each
country. We have tried to compensate for data inadequacies by using more of it and by
aggregating it into indicators.
In summary, the paper develops a framework to identify and measure (i) initial conditions
clusters of transition countries, (ii) the key determinants of transition, and (iii) indicators of
performance and a framework on how the determinants affect them. By examining inter- and
intra-cluster differences, the paper highlights the underlying patterns of transition.
2 A heuristic model of transition
The framework of the present paper is based on a heuristic model of transition comprising six
elements. These are the transition production function, the initial conditions of transition, an
initial conditions cluster typology, categories of determinants of transition, measures of transition
performance, and the use of indicators. In this section we examine each of these elements in turn.
2.1 The transition production function
We view the transition process as the result of several mostly sequential “production functions”.
These are illustrated in Figure 1 and relate to the figure’s three “blocks”: Determinants, Reform,
and Performance. The production functions produce outputs over three different time periods, the
short-run, medium-term and long-run. Since the transition process has not been in progress long
enough for a long-run measurement to reflect underlying transition progress, we place a
particular emphasis on medium-term variables. We refer to these as “intermediate outcomes”
since they are not desirable for their own sake but rather for the long-run benefits they will
eventually confer. Examples of intermediate outcomes are “private-sector activity”, export
performance, foreign direct investment, country competitiveness (constructed in paper 2). We
examine in turn the three levels of production that comprise the heuristic model.
At the decision level, we see that government and donor objectives combine with a
country’s initial conditions as inputs to “produce” institutional and policy reforms and their
direct consequences. For example, a trade liberalization objective may lead to the policy of a
simplified and lower average rate tariff structure with the direct consequences being lower tariff
revenues.
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At the intermediate level, policy and institutional changes impact on the rest of the
economic system and, combined with exogenous shocks and the initial conditions – these are
impossible to avoid at any level – produce intermediate outcomes.
At the long-run level, the intermediate outcomes combine with the initial conditions and
exogenous shocks to produce long-term performance. It is primarily this performance that is the
ultimate goal of government and donors.
2.2 The initial conditions of transition
A central premise of our approach is that a country’s performance is affected by the conditions
with which it finds itself at the start of the transition period. Clearly a country that is isolated
geographically (or was, politically), has a low level of human capital, or has few paved roads
will find itself at a performance disadvantage. We identify twelve categories of initial conditions.
The categories and their variables used are given in Table 1.
It is also useful to think of the initial conditions as being of three types. “Fixed” initial
conditions are those that are invariant and impossible to change. Examples would be geography,
topography, natural resource endowment, culture, history, and climate. “Hard” initial conditions
are primarily those that can be changed but not quickly. Examples include the quality of
institutions (private, public, and market), industrial structure, ownership, public attitudes,
composition of economic output, level and quality of human and physical capital stocks. It is a
matter of semantics whether such characteristics such as degree of urbanization, literacy, and
demographics (and its rates of change) are “fixed” or “hard”. We take the view that variables that
can be affected by donor aid are “hard” rather than “fixed”. “Soft” initial conditions primarily
refer to government policy such as the tax code. One could consider international relations and
agreements here as well. Thus “hard” and “soft” refer to the speed at which an initial condition
can be changed.
Good initial conditions present opportunities for government and donors to take advan-
tage of; bad initial conditions need to be compensated through policy and directed economic
activity. While initial conditions may not ultimately prevent a country from attaining a given
level of performance, they do influence the speed and cost of such attainment in two ways,
directly as a “fixed effect” and indirectly as an “interaction effect”. As an example, consider the
two effects of being a land-locked country on exports. This may have a direct effect by
increasing transportation costs by a fixed amount relative to those of a country with a coast. At
the same time, being land-locked might have an indirect effect by decreasing the effectiveness of
trade liberalization policies.
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Table 1: Categories of initial conditions and their key variables.
Initial conditions category Key variables
Physical geography distance to major port, landlocked population,
landlocked country, adjacent to a thriving
economy, resource balance, natural resource
abundance.
Macroeconomics variables gross domestic savings, consumption, 85-89
growth of GDP, inflation, domestic absorption,
government expenditures, black market prem-
ium, 1987-90 repressed inflation, government
revenues.
Demographics/health working age population, birth rate, population
growth, infant mortality, life expectancy,
public health expenditures, size of population,
urban population, urban population growth
Trade and trade orientation trade to GDP ratio, exports to CMEA countries
Infrastructure paved roads, telephones, electricity consump-
tion, hospital beds
Industrialization share of industry in GDP, share of agriculture
in GDP, industrial overhang, commercial
energy use
Wealth income per capita, GNP per capita adjusted for
PPP, televisions per capita, vehicles per capita,
private consumption.
Human capital school enrollment, education index, UNDP
human development index, physicians  per
capita
Market memory years under central planning, economic
freedom index, political rights index.
Physical capital domestic investment fixed domestic invest-
ment
Culture Percentage of Muslims, Christians and Ortho-
dox
Political situation war situation, former FSU dummy
Recently the literature has begun to incorporate the importance of initial conditions into the
analysis. Most notable is the work of de Melo, Denziger, Gelb and Tenev (1996). Their approach
is rather different from ours in that they statistically extract the first two principal components
(which they refer to as “clusters”) out of their initial condition variables for their later regression
analysis. As will be seen below, we retain a diversity of variables and use them in sensitivity
analysis to identify clusters of countries with similar initial conditions.
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2.3 Cluster typology
While at first sight, the 25 countries in our sample appear to exhibit a large variety of transition
experiences, in fact, mostly because of common geographical, historical, and resource patterns
there are significant similarities. So much so that by considering blocks or “clusters” of countries
based on their initial conditions as described above we can greatly simplify our analysis, as well
as highlight fundamental problems facing the various groups of transition economies. The cluster
approach allows us to identify the underlying issues in a way more satisfactory than 25 individ-
ual country assessments. In this step, we use the initial conditions to establish the most
parsimonious clustering possible by assigning countries to clusters in a way that minimizes
within-cluster country differences and maximizes across-cluster country differences.
The country clusters become the fundamental unit of analysis in the rest of this paper as
well as in the companion papers. The clusters facilitate our analysis in a number of ways. First,
by analyzing the inter-cluster similarities and differences, we can generate distinct patterns of
transition. The heart of the present paper, for example, comprises “benchmarking” the clusters
over time by calculating unweighted cluster-specific averages for the initial condition proxies,
intermediate outcomes, and other determinants of transition. This leads to the “patterns” reflected
in the title of this paper. Second, we examine country successes and failures within each cluster
in order to identify lessons learned regarding what policies might work better for a given
transition pattern (i.e., for a given set of cluster characteristics). By using cluster “dummies” as
fixed effects and in interaction terms with other explanatory variables, the cluster approach
permits in our companion econometrics paper a more controlled basis to assess the contribution
of policy and its effectiveness on intermediate outcomes and long run objectives. Finally, the
inter- and intra-cluster tabulations that emerge provide a rich diversity of stylized facts.
We should mention that there is an alternative way to capture the initial conditions than to
use country clusters. The approach taken by those following de Melo, Denziger, Gelb and Tenev
(1996) use the first two principal components of their group of initial condition variables. Given
that we identify seven clusters, their approach has the advantage that it uses up fewer “degrees of
freedom” in their regressions. It has the disadvantages that, first, the principal components are
not easy to interpret and, second, much detail is lost from the variable compression.
2.4 Determinants of transition
Our heuristic model posits that there are a number of determinants leading to a country’s
transition performance in addition to its initial conditions. These include:
· government objectives;
· policies and institution-building undertaken during transition (we will especially emphasize
the policy areas in which USAID/ENI operates);
· past economic performance;
· donor assistance received; and
· other idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., war).
Consider each in turn.
One of the virtues of our model is to recognize the importance of the objectives and
priorities of decision-makers in affecting outcomes. The government is primary among these.
Not only does it direct policy and institutional reform, but donor technical assistance is generally
received and implemented by the government. In acknowledgement of this fact, we explicitly
measure government priorities and objectives using survey responses on the degree of effort
governments allocate to various reforms. We do the same regarding donor assistance.
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As the major focus of study, policies and institution-building undertaken during transition
form a key category of transition determinants. In deference to USAID, we group these into the
reform areas in which USAID/ENI operates. These include enterprise privatization (strategic and
other), land privatization, trade liberalization, tax (and tax administration) reform, SME
development, social safety net development, capital market creation, banking sector reform,
corporate governance, and wage and price liberalization. Since privatization is of primary
interest to the study, we pay special attention to it in developing measures of policy determinants
of transition. In particular, we develop proxies for change-of-title, softness of budget constraints,
“agency” problems, and the management objective function.
Finally, exogenous shocks are an important determinant of transition. Perhaps the most
potent example would be war or civil unrest, either in the country itself or of a neighbor.
2.5 Measures of performance
While the determinants of transition describe the “production function” inputs, quantitative
analysis also requires measures of outputs or outcomes. These are broken into three groups or
“runs”. Short run outcomes refer to stock market volume, number of firms privatized, or amount
of government tax receipts in a year. Intermediate outcomes include such notions as share of the
private sector in economic activity, foreign direct investment, openness of the economy (and
particularly exports), the number of de novo firms, state of the macro economy, productivity, and
economic competitiveness. Long run outcomes include economic growth, income per capita,
wealth, and human well being.
2.6 Use of indicators
While the list of the variables mentioned in this section seems impressive, in fact as mentioned in
the introduction data scarcity is a major obstacle of any work on transition economies. We
confront this in three ways. First, we have collected as much data as currently available from
reputable sources. This has led to a massive database of several hundred variables. Second, we
have augmented this database by carrying out our own special survey of 25 foreign economic
research institutes located in the transition economies. Third, we have extensively used indicators
constructed from all the sources above3.
Indicators have several advantages. If their constituent data are noisy or even missing, the
aggregation afforded by the indicator is able to cancel these out and put the “law of large
numbers” to work. Indicators also provide an easy way to capture a concept in the case that a
single specific variable cannot; examples of this are presented below.
In this study, we develop indicators for all intermediate and long run performance measures
and for “competitiveness”, “depth-of-privatization”, overall “progress-in-transition” outcomes
and each USAID reform category. In each case, it would be impossible to summarize the concept
implied by the indicator’s name by using a single existing variable. Thus, for example, we build
up a competitiveness indicator from over 70 variables. Similarly, we construct a “depth-of-
privatization” measure by aggregating measures (themselves indicators) for change-of-title,
softness of budget constraints, and “agency” problems/management objective.
The construction of the indicators is done in a hierarchical way. For each level, starting from
the lowest, and within the same branch of the definitional tree (for which the weights add up to
one), we:
                                                
3 For a more thorough discussion on the ideology, motivation and technique of the use of indicators, see Sachs,
Zinnes, Eilat (2000,  vol.2).
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(1) For each conceptual level select variables, ensuring that each one is monotonically related to
the concept,4
(2) sign them (multiply by –1, where necessary) so that each new variable is positively related to
the concept level (i.e., so that “more is better”),
(3) standardize5 all the variables, including any sub-indicators constructed from the previous
level,
(4) multiply them by the assigned weights, and
(5) add up all the resulting products.
We then climb up one level up and repeat this five-step process until we reach the highest level
As were the variables, the weights are chosen by canvassing expert opinion (including our own)
about the relative importance of the variables selected in capturing the underlying concept. In
some cases, however, we made adjustments to reflect our knowledge of data quality and
quantity.6
 This approach allows us both to track the progress of a country over time as well as to
compare the progress of countries.
While the construction of the indicators is relatively straightforward, we did encounter a
large number of methodological challenges. Let us highlight what some of these issues are.
To make cross-country comparisons, we often needed to deflate (divide) variables of
interest by another variable (the deflator). For example, Russia may have greater absolute levels
of stock market capitalization but this itself is not economically interesting. What is interesting is
this measure after “correcting” for the relative size of the country or economy. In most cases, the
obvious choice is GDP. However, there are a number of problems with using GDP. First, due to
the existence of large unofficial economies7 (whose share of total activity varies significantly
across countries), official GDP can grossly under-represent the true size of economic activity. An
alternative deflator is to use population. The problem here is that population does not reflect the
level of economic activity as accurately as GDP, nor the size and extent of the market. We have,
therefore, applied the most appropriate deflator in each case, according to the concept we wanted
to capture. In some cases, we use the logarithmic transformation of the population when we
believed that the variable should have been higher for a bigger country, but less than proportional
to the size of the population. (For example, this was the case when deflating the number of local
and foreign insurance companies).
Much of the data for transition economies suffers from a multitude of reporting biases
and measurement problems, often related to the newness of government collection agencies as
well as to corruption. We have addressed this problem in a number of ways. First we have used
as many variables as possible to capture particular concepts. Second, we try to overcome biases
by using seemly identical variables. For example for exports, we have used both figures reported
via the balance of payments statistics as well as through the trade authorities.
                                                
4 In other words, the variable’s relationship to the conceptual level being captured must be uniformly either positive
or negative and not depend on value of the variable. See the example of “unemployment” below on how to correct
for non-monotonicity.
5 To standardize, we subtract the sample mean from each observation and then divide the result by the sample
standard deviation. This forces a mean of zero and a variance of one across countries and years, making otherwise
“unlike” objects “like” objects suitable for aggregation.
6 We mention “quantity” here since a small number of variables were included though their coverage across coun-
tries or years was incomplete.
7 This occurs due to tax evasion, avoidance of predatory bureaucracies, corruption, and weak statistical agencies.
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A subtler problem concerns how two standardized variables of different series length
should be aggregated into the same indicator. (Recall that we scale sub-indicators to have a mean
of zero and a variance of 1 prior to aggregating them into an indicator). If two series, say foreign
direct investment available for only 1995 onward and foreign portfolio investment having a
coverage from 1990 to 1998, then, once they are each properly deflated and standardized, adding
together the two series would create a big “kink” in the indicator trend. This results from one
average being taken over nine years and the other average being taken over four years. To see
this, consider the aggregating two identical series, X95 available for 1995 onward and X90
available for 1990 onward and assume that X has rising trend. Then during the standardization
process we would subtract a smaller mean from each of the observations of X90 than we would
from X95 since the mean of X90 would also contain earlier years and therefore smaller numbers
pulling down the average which we subtract. Combining X90 and X95 and plotting the result
would show a jump in the line in 1995 even though they are the same series by construction. To
correct this we use a smaller mean during the standardization of X95. How much smaller?
Simply the difference between the two means evaluated over the 1995 observations.
3 Clustering countries by initial conditions
As explained in section 2.3, the cluster approach allows us to identify the underlying issues in a
way more parsimonious than 25 individual country assessments. At first blush, it may seem as
some risk of over-simplification to take the extreme view that initial conditions are the over-
riding determining factor of a country’s performance. However, there are two variants of this
view. Under the strong variant, the main determinants that matter are those that are related to the
“fixed” initial conditions as defined in section 2.2; the weak variant would add to these the
“hard” and “soft” initial conditions. Our approach follows the latter. Since “hard” and “soft”
conditions can be changed over time, the weak variant indirectly implies greater potential impact
from policy and institutional change over the long run than would the “strong” variant.
Our goal is therefore to assign countries to groups based on similarity in initial condi-
tions, in a way that minimizes within-cluster country differences and maximizes across-cluster
country differences. In order to achieve this goal, we identify a list of representative variables
that describe the initial conditions. These variables are chosen to proxy for a wide variety of
aspects that, based on economic theory, are relevant for the countries’ prospects of transition
performance and may be relevant for the recommended policy treatment. Countries will be
clustered together only if they display a strong similarity in a wide range of aspects.
The purpose of this clustering is twofold. First, in the phase of investigating policy effect-
iveness it will allow us to derive strong conclusions by comparing between performances of
countries that belong to the same cluster, but follow different policy paths. Second, in the phase
of policy recommendations we may want to distinguish between global recommendations and
cluster specific recommendations.
In econometric terms, the use of cluster dummies in our regressions will provide the
necessary control for different starting points of the countries, without losing excessive degrees
of freedom that can weaken the power of our results. Furthermore, using interaction terms of the
cluster dummies with policy variables will allow us to investigate the relative effectiveness of
different policies in different clusters. This will help us derive policy prescriptions.
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3.1 Literature review
While we base our typology on an initial conditions approach, it is worth mentioning that the
literature contains other approaches to arrive at country typologies. The most common divide the
countries into “Eastern European” and “Former Soviet Union”. While there is merit in this
grouping, especially since it stresses shared history as well as geography, we find it a bit too
broad in that it obscures important insights. Two other approaches have been taken that bear
mention, once focusing on transition period performance and the other on country policy
orientation.
The first shown in Table 2 is Szyrmer [1998] and is representative of several studies which
have identified performance as the discriminating variable for membership. While this typology
captures the recent experience as well as the end point (i.e., where we are now), it is not directly
based on fundamentals, making it potentially less appealing for long-run applications. Moreover,
this type of clustering does not provide a useful basis for econometric analysis explaining the
reasons for success, itself.
Table 2: Transition trend-based typologies
Group Sub-group Country membership
I. “Successes” A Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,
B Bulgaria, Hungary,
C Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
II. Borderline Czech Republic, Moldova, Romania,
III. “Failures” Russia, Ukraine,
IV. Unallocated Caucuses Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Balkans Albania, Macedonia
Unreformed Belarus
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Source: Szyrmer (1998)
A second type of grouping is based on the policy focus of the transition countries. The
grouping in Table 3 of Dabrowski (1996) is a good example of this. It is based on three aspects:
the speed of action, the comprehensiveness and consistency of policy, and cumulative progress.
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Table 3: Development policy typology
Group* Country membership
Immediate accession German Democratic Republic
Quick launchers Albania,  Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia
Slow but coordinated Hungary, Slovenia






Lack of systemic change Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Countries at war Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, , Georgia, Serbia, Tajikistan
Notes: *Names of groups assigned by present authors. **Macedonia is not explicitly included by Dabrowski but we
have placed it where we think his criteria would have dictated.
Source: Dabrowski (1996)
3.2 Cluster methodology
The process of creating the clusters is done using two methods, and then a feedback method is
used to verify the effectiveness of the results. The first method for clustering is to generate
computer clusters using our economic, political and geographical variables, presented in Table
1.8 The program then generates clusters in a way that minimizes the average variance of the
variables within each cluster, and maximizes the average distances between the clusters’ means.
This guarantees that any two members of a given cluster are on average more similar to each
other, with respect to the chosen list of variables, than two countries belonging to different
clusters. The output of the program is then a list of the countries in each cluster.
The advantage of using this method is that it generates the clusters directly from
economic fundamentals, without the necessity of having any prior beliefs about the form the
clustering should take. By repeatedly using the routine for different variations of the variable list,
strong clustering tendencies become apparent. Yet, we should note that there is no one clean-cut
clustering since the clusters generated by the program can sometimes change with the exact
variable list chosen. These variations will be discussed below.
The second method for the clustering, which is used to supplement the first, is to plot key
variables against the suggested clustering. This demonstrates graphically the tightness of the
clustered groups, and shows what countries tend to be outliers in their groups. Moreover, it gives
us a better feeling for what variables drive the clustering, and what variables tend to generate the
exceptions in the different cases. This information is useful for a better understanding of the
clusters.
As a final check of the appropriateness of our allocation of countries to clusters, we
analyzed9 the statistical significance of the cluster fixed effect and interaction dummies in
regressions of performance on policy. The significance of the dummies suggests that the groups
do differ in a way relevant for transition performance. Moreover, the significance of the
interaction terms show that there are differences between the groups in the effectiveness of
policy measures.
                                                
8 We did this by inputting a selected list of relevant variables into the statistical computer software, STATA and
running a clustering routine developed at the U.S. Geological Service.
9 The results of this analysis are provided in Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat, (2000, vol 3).
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Note that we occasionally used the first and second principal components taken from de
Melo, Denziger, Gelb and Tenev (1996) in addition to the initial conditions variables listed in
Table 1. These have been widely used in the transition literature. The first principal component
represents mostly macroeconomic distortions and unfamiliarity with the market process (trade
dependence, repressed inflation, black market premium and years under central planning). The
second principal component can represent the level of development (income per capita, urbaniza-
tion, over-industrialization and natural resources).
3.3 The transition clusters
Applying the methods laid out above suggests that we group the countries into seven groups,
summarized in Table 4. Before entering into detail on how the clusters scored for each initial
condition, we first provide a brief description of each cluster and then indicate where the
clustering is weakest.
Table 4: Summary of the initial conditions-based typology
Cluster name* Country membership
EU-border states (1) Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,
The Balkans (2) Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania
Baltic States (3) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Albania (4) Albania
Western FSU (5) Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine
Caucuses (6) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
Central Asia (7) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
*The number in parentheses is used as a cluster identifier in the analysis in the following
chapters.
EU Border States (1): includes Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Croatia. This group demonstrates a very strong similarity in most variable groups, and
especially in development, geography, infrastructure, population, human capital, and economic
freedom. For all these variables the countries in this group score higher than countries in other
groups. One notable exception is the former Czechoslovakian countries, which suffered from
lower economic and democratic freedom. It should also be noted that our variables did not
provide any grounds for distinguishing between the new states (Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia)
and the rest of the group. Slovenia, for example, scored higher than the veteran states on most
categories.
Balkan States (without Albania) (2): includes Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania. The
countries in this cluster differ in many historical/political aspects, but nevertheless they display a
strong similarity in many economical variables such as population, physical capital, initial wealth
and macroeconomic variables. It should be noted that Bulgaria scores highest in the group in
most of these categories, and in this sense it is the closest to the EU states. Romania has
significantly higher natural resources, and Macedonia is a landlocked country and has a bigger
agriculture sector and is therefore less industrialized. It is also a new country, and belonged in
the past to a country with more economic and democratic freedom. A final note should be made
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about Albania: due to its special features we placed it into its own group. It will therefore be
discussed more thoroughly under group (4).
Baltic States (3): Include Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The countries in this group are
almost identical to each other in every aspect considered. The only thing worth noting is that
Lithuania has a slightly bigger agricultural sector and a slightly lower income. In many aspects
the Baltic countries are similar to the Western FSU countries, and especially industrialization,
population and human capital. Yet some grounds could be found for distinguishing between the
groups, once considering geographical differences (location, proximity to thriving economies,
size of population), free-market memory, and infrastructure.
Albania (4): Albania is a unique case in its political history and its economical starting
point. It is enough to note that it displays the lowest levels of initial wealth, development and
infrastructure in our sample (sometimes by considerable margins) and that it was totally isolated
from the outside world for many years, to understand why it deserves a special treatment. We
considered two “natural” groups in which to group Albania: the Balkans, and Central Asia. The
only justification that we found for including Albania in the former is its geographical location.
Albania has access to the sea, and is extremely close to a developed European country (Italy).
Nevertheless, its bizarre pre-transitional political situation did not allow it to exploit its favorable
location. We therefore find that in terms of pure initial conditions it fits much better into the
landlocked group of Central Asia, especially in variables of development, initial wealth,
population and even culture (religion). Yet, for our purposes it may not be appropriate to add it
to this group: once the political barriers were lifted, Albania’s “landlocked” initial conditions
were no longer valid. In a sense, with the end of autarky Albania “moved” its location from
Central Asia to the Adriatic. Albania can have, after a catching-up period, similar prospects of
performance as other countries in its (new) region, provided it knows how to make use of its
favorable location. Albania is, therefore, disqualified from both groups. As if to cement its case,
the computer clustering routine suggested that Albania should be grouped on its own.
Western FSU (5). Includes Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. This is a rather
heterogeneous group. Nevertheless, the countries in this group do display some similarity that
justifies their group status. Examples of the similarity are industrialization (with the exception of
Moldova), population variables, initial wealth and most infrastructure variables. On the other
hand, many countries in this group have unique features: Russia for example, is considerably
larger than the other countries and is different along many political dimensions and its recent
history. Moldova is less industrialized, and usually scores lower in terms of development, human
development and initial wealth. In many ways it resembles the Balkan countries: culture,
population variables and some welfare variables. Yet the overall clustering results supports
leaving it in the western FSU group. In addition, one should point out that Moldova and Belarus
are landlocked countries; even Russia has poor ocean access.
The Caucasus (6). Includes Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The data were ambiguous
about whether to maintain the Caucasus as a group of its own, or rather, split it into two, with
Georgia and Armenia on the one hand, joining the Western FSU countries and Azerbaijan, on the
other hand, with its similarities joining Central Asia. Deciding between the two options was
perhaps the most ambiguous question in the cluster analysis. We eventually decided to keep the
Caucasus as an independent group. The driving force for this decision was geographical and
political as well as practical. Georgia and Armenia score on average lower than the Western FSU
on initial wealth and infrastructure variables. This provides some motivation for separating
between Georgia/Armenia and the Western FSU. Once an independent Caucasus is formed,
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Azerbaijan seems much closer to it than to Central Asia, even though it fits the latter better than
the Western FSU in terms of culture, population and initial wealth.
Central Asia (7). Includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan. These countries display a very strong similarity in all aspects apart from natural
resources (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan scoring much higher, the Kyrgyz Republic and
Tajikistan scoring much lower) and size (Kazakhstan is considerably bigger than the others).
Kazakhstan consistently scores better then other countries in the group in terms of development
and initial wealth and it has a higher urbanization rate. Along these dimensions, Kazakhstan
could also fit into the Caucasus. Yet, mainly due to cultural and geographical parameters, we
have kept it in the Asian group.
No typology is perfect. As the foregoing discussion suggests, our analysis also allows us to
identify some problematic countries for which there is some ambiguity regarding their place-
ment. We summarize this information in Table 5. We note in ending that since the “hard” and
“soft” initial conditions may be affected by the other determinants of transition, it would be
eventually necessary to re-conduct the clustering analysis. Perhaps after a decade or more in
transition, Albania will once again look like a Balkan country, the Caucasus may “move” back to
the Western FSU with Azerbaijan joining Central Asia, and Macedonia will leave the Balkans
(or join Albania?). Only time – and additional analysis – will tell.
Table 5: Summary of clustering tendencies among transition countries*
Group** Countries in group Least-fitting
countries in the
group




Croatia, Czech Rep., Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,
(Croatia) (Bulgaria)
The Balkans (2) Bulgaria,  Macedonia, Romania (Bulgaria) (Moldova), (Albania), (Croatia)
The Baltics (3) Estonia, Latvia,  Lithuania (Belarus)
(Russia)











Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan




*Countries in parentheses represent a weaker tendency to leave or join a group.
**Numbers in parentheses indicate the cluster number used in the graphs in the rest of this paper
3.4 Inter-cluster differences in initial conditions
To give the reader a better idea as to how the clusters “look” we can examine how the clusters
differ according to their initial conditions. For this purpose we provide Figure 2, which contains
histogram examples of selected initial condition variables from the full set as well as Table 10 in
the annex, which contains all the centroids (cluster means) and within-cluster standard devia-
tions.
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Regarding Figure 2, a number of observations are apparent. With the exception of
Albania which does the absolute worst, we see that per capita incomes are more or less
correlated to distance to London. Note, however that there are not dramatic differences between
the  Baltics, Balkans, Western FSU and the Caucasus – a surprising fact considering how differ-
ent their future performance trajectories become.
Consider the fixed initial conditions. As an example from the geography group we have
chosen the percent of the population within 100 kilometers of a major coast. Here we see that the
Caucasus and Central Asia distinguish themselves from the other clusters as being particularly
low. For demographics, we see that while Central Asia and Albania have very high population
growth rates, the other cluster are all very low, with the Balkans actually negative; these rates
appear to be negatively correlated with per capita incomes.
Consider next the “hard” initial conditions. For telephone lines per 1000 persons, the
Baltics and Albania are by far the best and worst. The other clusters more or less follow a CEE-
FSU split, though the Balkans surprisingly outperform the EU Border States10. For the economic
freedom indicator, the CEE-FSU differences are clear (which is perhaps not surprising taking
into account that the FSU countries were given a uniform value for this variable) with the EU
Border States with the best score.11 The UNDP human development indicator more or less
follows per capita income, with the exception that the Balkans and Baltics switch places.
Finally, consider the “soft” initial conditions. Both repressed inflation and the black
market premium reflect the CEE-FSU divide (again, the FSU has a uniform value), with the
latter having values of two and four times as big as the former, respectively.
While we provide Table 10 in the annex mainly for completeness, a few observations
may still be added. First, we draw the reader’s attention to the standard deviations. These
indicate roughly just how “tight” the individual clusters are. Thus, for example we see that the
variable, “Distance to a major port” is very tight while income per capita is less so. In general the
table evidently supports the view that the FSU should be split from the non-FSU. The table also
reveals, however, splits in the FSU on the dimensions of culture and demographics, for example.
Finally, the table reveals how good initial conditions are not necessarily a guarantee for future
success. The Western FSU, for example, comes out rather well in wealth-related measures,
surprising given its later poor performance.
                                                
10 Yet, one should note that this variable reflects only the quantity of the telephones, not their quality.
11 Interestingly, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (as Czechoslovakia) are an exception, scoring among the worst in
the sample for these variables.
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Figure 2: Representative initial conditions by cluster, 1989-90. Sources: see Table 9.
Percent of population within 100 km of major river/coast Black market premium, 1990 (%)
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Figure 2: (continued)
Telephones lines per 1000 persons, 1989. Annual Income per capita, PPP adjusted, 1990 (USD).
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3.5 Intra-cluster differences in initial conditions
As a final window into the initial conditions clustering, consider the situation regarding the
within-cluster variations exhibited by the transition countries. A summary of these is provided in
Figure 3. In the figure we have selected the same variables presented in the inter-cluster
comparison above with the exception that we drop the policy variable graphs (since their values
for clusters made up of FSU countries would all have the same values). These figures make clear
that Albania is a group of its own.
Turning first to the “fixed” initial conditions (landlocked population) we see that Russia
does not fit in well with the rest of the Western FSU, that Georgia is different from the rest of the
Caucasus, and that Macedonia is very different from the rest of the Balkans.
Regarding “hard” initial conditions (telephone lines per 1000 people), here we see tighter
clusterings though now Bulgaria is the outlier in the Balkans. Population growth is another
variable with very tight clustering, though here again the exception is the Balkans. With the
exception of the Central Asia cluster, the FSU groups also all score similarly in this respect.
Finally we add the first principal component of de Melo et. al.(1996) to round out the dis-
cussion. This variable captures mostly macroeconomic distortions and unfamiliarity with the
market process (trade dependence, repressed inflation, black market premium and years under
central planning). Here we find the tightest clustering of all the variables, indicating how
strongly related are the principal component technique and the clustering technique. Note how
the mean zero line perfectly bifurcates the countries into FSU and non-FSU; this has the
implication that the Balkan group exhibits the closest performance to the EU Border States.
Figure 3: Intra-cluster comparisons of initials conditions, 1989-90. (Cluster numbers are from
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Figure 3: (continued) Intra-cluster comparisons of initials conditions, 1989-90. (Cluster numbers
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Figure 3 (continued) Intra-cluster comparisons of initials conditions, 1989-90. (Cluster numbers
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4 Government objectives and donor priorities
To evaluate the performance of transition policies and to produce recommendations on how to
improve them in the future require explicit measures of what the decision-makers’ objectives
were and are. To assess how well a reform was executed it is necessary to know how important it
was to the executor. We need to be able to distinguish between the case that country character-
istics, weak institutions, or related economic performance impeded the success of a reform from
the case that the government placed a low or no priority on its implementation. In the first two
sub-sections and with the help of our field survey, we identify and quantify the objectives,
respectively, of each country’s governments and participating donors over time. In the final sub-
section we compare the congruence of these objectives across reform categories and over time.
4.1 Government objectives
Clearly any measure of government objectives is going to be imperfect. Nevertheless, given its
importance, this should not be used as an excuse to avoid its quantification. There are at least
two approaches possible, one through “revealed preference” and one through government
statements. The former would look at what reforms actually receive the most budgetary support
from the government. While theoretically appealing, in practice we were unable to get consistent
data at the level of the individual reforms.
Instead, we took the second approach. We did this by surveying government bureaucrats
and higher-level decision-makers involved in the reforms at the time to determine what reforms
had received the most effort, priority and attention (though not necessarily the best results). Ten
reform areas were selected. These included:
· Enterprise privatization
· Strategic sector privatization
· Enterprise (pre-privatization) restructuring
· Tax code and tax administration reform
· Judicial reforms
· Social safety net reform
· Trade liberalization
· Stock market creation
· SME promotion
Permissible answers included:
· Strongly against (-2)
· Weakly against (-1)
· Not a priority (0)
· A low priority (1)
· A high priority (2)
We examine the results of their responses in a number of ways. First, we compute a
measure of the government’s total commitment to reforms. The measure, which we call
“Government Commitment”, is simply the average of the scores for each reform. We look at this
measure both across time and across clusters. Then we examine the variation in government
responses by reform area over time.
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Figure 4: Non-FSU and Baltics Government Commitment to Reform. Source: Survey and
authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4 and Figure 5 summarize for the FSU (including the Baltics) and non-FSU
(excluding the Baltics) clusters, respectively, the governments’ commitment to the main USAID
reform areas over time. Scores are plotted by years since transition has begun, not by calendar
year. Thus, “T+3” indicates the value in the third year since the start of transition.
These figures reveal a number of insights. We see that from the third year of transition, the
Western FSU’s interest in reform plateaued. As we shall see below, this is in keeping with their
reform performance as well. On the other hand, Central Asia and the Caucasus display a similar
and continuous increased zeal for reform, though they started from a slightly higher level of
interest from the beginning. The Balkans also experienced a plateau in the from the middle of the
transition decade. At the other end of the spectrum are the EU Border States and the Baltics.
They begin with a high level of reform commitment and, as reform progressed, so too did the
level of (and need for) further commitment.
Let us now consider the same graphs but for selected reforms. Of greatest interest due the
strong feelings it generates is strategic sector privatization. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Here
we see that only the Baltics showed any real level of interest in this reform. In fact, most clusters
register a negative interest, at least in the first years of transition. The EU Border States, for
example, are against strategic sector privatization until the fourth year of reform, and then they
show only a weak interest. The FSU clusters show a similar pattern, with the Western FSU
showing over the last two years the highest interest of the sample, with the exception of the
Baltics.
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Figure 6: Government commitment to strategic sector privatization over the decade of transition.
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4.2 Donor assistance priorities12
As presented in the description of our heuristic model summarized by Figure 1, donor aid can
have both direct and indirect effects on the initiation and effectiveness of reform.13 However, as
in the case of government objectives, developing a measure of donor interest or effort is not
straightforward. While there are data on the total level of technical assistance by bi-lateral and
multi-level sources as well as by originating country, we know of no dataset that allocates these
expenditures by reform category. Therefore, as we did in the previous section for government
effort, we use a survey interest to collect this information.
Prior to presenting these, we present in Figure 7 a summary by cluster of the inter-cluster
patterns over time of total aid per capita. In order to present as much of the data as possible and
since technical assistance levels were less sensitive to the point in the transition cycle of a
country, we have presented the data by calendar year rather than by transition year, which we
used in the previous subsections. Here we see that Central Asia and the Caucasus have received a
fairly continuous increase in assistance over the period. While Central Asia seems to have started
from rather low initial levels it is the Caucasus cluster that has reached the highest recipient
levels of the sample. The Western FSU, on the other hand, shows exactly the opposite trend,
namely downward-sloping. Moreover it is the cluster with the lowest average aid per capita
levels. The Balkans, while receiving a somewhat volatile flow of assistance appears to have
reached plateau levels by early in the decade. Finally, the EU Border States and the Baltics after
the first year of transition seem to remain at slightly above average levels for the whole period.
These tendencies are explored further in Figure 8, which presents average levels of per
capita aid at the intra-cluster level for the periods 1992-4 and 1995-7. We see that while the
general average level has risen from the first to the second period (as illustrated by the horizontal
line in each graph in the figure), the general recipient pattern of giving is maintained. All
countries receiving the highest amount in one period also receive it in the later period. These
highest scorers appear to be a mix of the better reformers of their cluster (such as Estonia,
Kyrgyz Republic, Poland, and Hungary) as well as the more needy (such as Macedonia and
Armenia). Regarding EU Borders States, we see a huge variance, relative to the other clusters in
the early period. Here the “new” states are at the bottom of the cluster’s aid ranking, perhaps
indicating the high strategic importance that the donors placed on the northern Border States at
the start of the decade. In the later period, while the cluster average aid received rose about 20
percent (the “square” in cluster line), emphasis was to the “new” states, though Poland remained
a favorite. For the Balkans, the main change in the later period was the large increase in
Macedonia’s assistance, probably reflecting the compensating contributions it received as a
result of the various Balkan crises with Serbia. What is curious in the case of the Western FSU is
that Belarus seems to be the favored country of the cluster in the early period, not Russia or
Ukraine. Nevertheless, this cluster received the second lowest aid levels in the early period and
the lowest average levels in the later period. This may simply reflect that these countries have
among the biggest populations of the sample and that aid giving per-capita may be diminishing
in population size. Regarding the Caucasus we see the highest average levels of the sample,
                                                
12 Albania is a special case in the context of aid since it received a massive amount of aid for reconstruction.
Therefore it was not included in the discussion in this chapter. For completeness, note that the aid per capita
received by Albania was significantly higher than the other countries, especially in the years 92-95.
13 For discussions of the impact of donor aid on policy formation see Boone (1995) and Kaminski et. al. (1995).
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though here we see that Azerbaijan appears to the donors as belonging in Central Asia since its
receipts are equal in the later period to the average receipts of the latter cluster. Finally for
Central Asia, we see reform-minded Kyrgyz receiving very strong donor support, especially in
the later period.
Our survey question asked all the key donors in each country to score their organization’s
priorities in their host country for each reform area. We attempted to canvass the opinions of
those in the local office familiar with their organization’s activities for each reform category over
the relevant time period. The reform categories are the same as those indicated for government
objectives above. Permissible responses were:
· No donor active in country (0)
· Minimal assistance (0.66)
· Some assistance (1.33)
· Extensive assistance (2)
Looking first at the total donor commitments we see that the donors show the least
enthusiasm in the EU Border States. On the other hand, they show the strongest interest in the
Baltics, though with a slight downward trend. The other clusters all receive increasing donor
interest over the reform period. Among all the non-Baltic FSU countries, donors show the most
initial interest in the Western FSU at the start of the period and the least interest in this cluster by
the end of the period. Finally, it is the Caucasus that show the greatest change in donor interest:
they start with no interest and end the period with the greatest donor interest.
Figure 7:  Inter-cluster differences in official aid per capita (USD) since the start of transition
Source: WDI.
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Figure 8: Intra-cluster differences in average official aid per capita (USD) for the periods 1992-
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Figure 10: A comparison of aid per capita and donor reform commitment. Source: WDI and
Authors’ calculations.
In order to generate some confidence in the new aid commitment data, we compare it to
the aid per capita figures from the earlier graphs. We do this in Figure 10 where we plot the two
variables for the full panel dataset (so that countries appear several times)14. Here we see a
strong, positive correlation between these two measures. The primary reason why the fit is not
even better is because our donor commitment variable reflects only seven specific reform areas.
There are other motivations for aid-giving besides these specific areas, e.g., water infrastructure
investment
4.3 A comparison of government and donor priorities
While a rigorous econometric analysis is outside the scope of the present paper (see paper 3 of
this series), it is useful to contrast the priorities of governments and the donors over time and by
reform category. Ultimately, a number of direct questions would help to form a better
understanding of the interaction between these key groups of decision makers.
· What reforms show the most scope for controversy? For agreement?
· Is there learning, causing priorities to converge over time and if so which side “bends” (i.e.,
adopts the other’s orientation)?
· What reforms does each side see as the most important at the beginning of the reform cycle?
· Does zeal for reform increase or decrease over time?
· How does commitment change as reforms are carried out?
                                                
14 We have removed Poland for 1995 and Albania for 1991-3 from the graph since their aid per capita figures were
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The graphs of Figure 11, however, do convey some clues to the answers to these
interesting questions. First, it is clear that there is considerable divergence between governments
and donors with respect to sectoral emphasis of commitment. This appears true especially in the
first half of the reform period. With the exception of privatization in the Balkans, there does
appear to be convergence in 1995-8 period. We also see that divergences were not equal on
average across reform categories. The sector with the biggest divergence of interests is strategic
sector privatization.
However, to best draw out the general tendencies, we summarize these graphs into two,
one aggregating score differences across clusters in Figure 12 and the other across sectors in
Figure 13. We see that stock market creation, as well as tax reforms in the first period of
transition, seem to have shown the least divergence between the donors and governments while
strategic privatization has the most divergence. We see that divergence has increased, however,
in the areas of non-strategic privatization, tax reform and social safety net reform. With the
exception of the Baltics (and the Balkans where there was no change in divergence over the two
periods), governments’ and donors’ priorities have shown a definite convergence over time. This
is seen in Figure 13 where the second period bars are smaller than those of the first period. The
least divergence is found in the Caucasus.
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Figure 11: A comparison of donor efforts and government priorities. Source: Survey and Authors’ calculations.
Notes: A=Non-strategic privatization, B=strategic privatization, C=Enterprise restructuring, D=Stock market creation, E=Judiciary reform, F=Tax reform,
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Figure 11: A comparison of donor efforts and government priorities. Source: Survey and Authors’ calculations. (continued)
Notes: A=Non-strategic privatization, B=strategic privatization, C=Enterprise restructuring, D=Stock market creation, E=Judiciary reform, F=Tax reform,
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Figure 11: A comparison of donor efforts and government priorities. Source: Survey and Authors’ calculations. (continued)
Notes: A=Non-strategic privatization, B=strategic privatization, C=Enterprise restructuring, D=Stock market creation, E=Judiciary reform, F=Tax reform,
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Figure 11: A comparison of donor efforts and government priorities. Source: Survey and Authors’ calculations. (continued)
Notes: A=Non-strategic privatization, B=strategic privatization, C=Enterprise restructuring, D=Stock market creation, E=Judiciary reform, F=Tax reform,
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Figure 12: Average degree of divergence across reform sectors and clusters. Source: Authors’
calculations.
Notes: A=Non-strategic privatization, B=strategic privatization, C=Enterprise restructuring, D=Stock market creation,
E=Judiciary reform, F=Tax reform, G=Social safety net, H=SME promotion, I=Trade liberalization.
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5 Transition policies and institutions
The production function in section 2.1 takes inputs and turns them into transition performance.
Above we examined one set of important inputs, the objectives of decision-makers. In this section
we develop and present the inputs that comprise policies and institutional changes as well as their
direct impacts (e.g., a tariff reform and the amount of tariff revenues collected). We break our
discussion into two parts. We first look at comprehensive measures of privatization that capture the
full breadth of the term according to the recent economic literature. We then develop measures for
the other USAID reform areas. For each part, we first present the “recipes” for the seven progress-
in-reform indicators. Then we examine, as always the inter- and intra-cluster differences through
time. These indicators may help us assess “graduation” points for technical assistance.
5.1 Depth of Privatization
Here we construct and examine indicators for the components of privatization policy that together
dictate the performance that privatization engenders. We first motivate the constituent elements of
the depth-of-privatization concept and then present “recipes” on the construction of the sub-indi-
cators. The resulting indicators are then contrasted in terms of inter- and intra-cluster differences.
5.1.1 Constructing indicators
One of the key hypotheses (verified in paper 3 of this series) of this study is that change-of-title is
not enough to generate the gains to privatization. Gains require “deeper” privatization than mere
change of title. Economic theory (see, for example, Sheshinski and López-Calva 1999) suggests that
the “depth” of privatization depends on addressing at least three other institutional and regulatory
issues.15 Central among these are the firms’ budget constraint, agency problems, and the
management objective function. Together we refer to these as “OBCA” reforms (from the first letter
of each of these). The hardness of the budget constraint issue (see Kornai 1994) refers to the firm’s
belief about whether it will be rescued by the government (or a donor) in case of financial distress,
and, ultimately, allowed to go bankrupt. In other words, the degree a firm has to bear the conse-
quences of its actions. The agency problem refers to whether the legal and regulatory regime pro-
vides the transparency, accountability and protection of shareholders (owners) to ensure adequate
monitoring and control of the management they have hired to run the firm (see Shleifer and Vishny
1997) for a more detailed discussion of the issue). The management objective function issue refers
to whether firms are run to maximize profits, revenues, employment, or particular political
objectives (Kornai 1986). Each of these aspects is captured in a sub-indicator, which we ultimately
aggregate to create the “OBCA” indicator.
                                                
15 See Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat (2000; vol. 3) for a detailed literature review concerning depth of privatization. See
Frydman et. al. (1996) and Pistor (1999) on corporate governance issues.
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Table 6: Depth of privatization indicators, 1990-1998.
Category Definition Effect Weight Variable Scoring Availability* Source
Indicator Pos 0.5 IDPcot M0V1 0-8 Computed
Large-scale privatization index Pos 0.2 L_priv 1 to 4.33 (1 worst) 4-8 EBRD
Small-scale privatization index Pos 0.2 S_priv 1 to 4.33 (1 worst) 4-8 EBRD
Percentage of small firms
privatized
Pos 0.2 Acfrmprv Percent 0-8 Survey, WB
Enterprise privatiza-
tion (COT: Change Of
Title)
Private sector employment share Pos 0.2 pr_em Percent 0-7 EBRD, WB




Indicator Pos 0.5 IDPin M0V1 0-8 Computed
Budget constraint Indicator Pos 0.4 Hardbudg M0V1 0-7 Computed
Tax arrears / average GDP Neg 0.2 TaxarAGd Percent 0-6 WB, EBRD
Budget subsidies / average GDP Neg 0.3 BsubAGdp Percent 1-7 EBRD
Bad loans / Total loans Neg 0.2 Badloan Percent 0-8 EBRD
Electricity tariff collection ratio Pos 0.1 Collrat Percent 4-7 EBRD
Likelihood of mid-sized private
firm being bailed out
Neg 0.2 BailG7b 0=very unlikely to
4=very likely
0-8 Survey
Indicator Pos 0.6 Agency M0V1 4-8 Computed
Existence of bankruptcy courts Pos 0.1 BktyctB9 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey




Legal system for investment index Pos 0.3 Leg 1 to 4.33 (1 worst) 5-8 EBRD
Notes:
Abbreviation Definition Abbreviation Definition
* The years of data availability (e.g., “2” is 1992). Heritage Heritage Foundation
@ Standardized by Havrylyshyn (see references) IFS IMF’s International Financial Statistics
Freedom Freedom House (see references) M0V1 Mean zero, variance 1
GFS IMF’s Government Financial Statistics Survey HIID Competitiveness in Transition Survey of
Foreign Institutes
Havrylyshyn His paper (see references) uses IMF and national sources WB World Bank Enterprise Reform and Privatization
Database
Hellman See references WDI World Development Indicators, World Bank
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The “recipe” for this set of indicators is given in Table 6. As is seen, the “depth-of-privatiza-
tion” indicator comprises two sub-indicators, “change of title” and OBCA. The latter itself com-
prises the sub-indicators, “budget” and “agency/objectives”. Before continuing, let us explain how
to read and interpret the sub-indicator tables. First note that all the categories and sub-categories of
the table have weights listed in the column “Weight” and the direction of the impact of the variable
on reform progress listed in the column “Effect”. These comprise hierarchical levels. For a given
level the weights add up to unity (1). Take as an example, privatization performance incentives.
Here, the weights for hardness of “budget” (0.4) and “agency/objective function problems” (0.6)
add to 1, as do the weights of the five and three variables used within each of these two sub-
categories.
5.1.2 Patterns of privatization
Figure 14 presents the progress in change-of-title privatization over the transition cycle by cluster.
(See the appendix for the associated country-level graphs). First note that all the clusters display an
upward trend on this measure. Next note that the trend shows strong signs of reaching an asymptote,
especially for the best performers. This is to be expected since there is a natural upper bound to this
indicator. We see that only the Baltics and the EU Border States achieve well above average results.
For the little data available, we see that Albania has reached change of title privatization levels com-
mensurate with the Baltics. The bottom panel of Figure 14 contains the within-cluster 1997 varia-
tion. Here we find reasonably tight clusters, with the exception of Belarus in the Western FSU, who
shows little activity in this regard, and Central Asia. On the other hand, Kyrgyz Republic scores at a
level equal to some Baltics and EU Border States.
Turning to OBCA reforms, a very different picture emerges, as we show in Figure 15. (See
the appendix for the associated country-level graphs). Here only the Caucasus and the EU Border
States show a strong upward trend improvement in these reforms, with the Baltics weighing in with
tepid improvements over the period. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Caucasus
start from a very low point while the Baltics start from a very favorable initial position. The
Balkans, Central Asia and the Western FSU show little progress with the FSU actually deteriorating
through the transition period. Comparing the 1998 levels, the clusters do not show much dispersion,
with the exception of Belarus, which is again trailing behind its cluster mates. In the EU Border
states the new states perform worst then the others.
This disparity between “change-of-title” and “OBCA” measures of privatization reform
progress has profound implications and is explored econometrically in our paper 3 of this series,
which assesses the relative importance these two indicators have in explaining country economic
performance.
To conclude this section, we aggregate these two measures into a “depth-of-privatization”
indicator. This is presented in Figure 16  (as well as at the country level in the appendix). In
summary, the EU Border States and the Baltics finish the period with the deepest privatization
reforms while the Balkans and the Caucasus reach scores that are slightly higher than the period
average scores. The Western FSU and Central Asia are both below the period average. Turning to
the within-cluster variation, we see no additional surprises not already discussed in the previous two
sub-indicators. Hungary and the Czech Republic are the best performers overall, followed by
Estonia. Note how in this case the EU Border States we see again the split, with the “new” states
coming in last.
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Figure 14: Inter- and intra-cluster variation of “change of title” indicator of privatization over the
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Figure 15: Inter- and intra-cluster variation of “OBCA” (firm incentives) indicator of privatization
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Figure 16: Inter- and intra-cluster variation of “Depth in Privatization” indicator over the transition
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Table 7: Policy and institutional reform indicators, 1990-1998.
Category Definition Effect Weight Variable Scoring Availability* Source
Social safety net (ssn) Indicator Pos 0.075 IPIssn M0V1 0-8 Computed
Unemployment program Pos 0.2 UnemplF1 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Early retirement program Pos 0.2 RetireF2 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Severance payment program Pos 0.2 ServerF3 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Working population with
pension / labor force
Pos 0.2 PpensC10 Percent 0-8 Survey
State retraining program Pos 0.2 SttrgE11 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Price and wage liberalization and
competition policy
Indicator Pos 0.17 IPIpwc M0V1 0-8 Computed
Prices Indicator Pos 0.4 Pricelib M0V1 0-8 Computed
Price liberalization index Pos 0.7 Lip 0 to 1 (1 best) 0-8 Havry,
EBRD
No. of administrative prices in
EBRD basket
Neg 0.3 Adpebrd 0 to 15 0-8 EBRD
Wages Indicator 0.2 Wagelib M0V1 0-8 Computed
Existence of wage controls Neg 0.5 WagconE7 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Restrictions on hiring and firing Neg 0.5 HirFiE10 0=minimal to
2=very restrictive
0-8 Survey
Competition Indicator 0.4 Complib M0V1 0-8 Computed
Competition policy index Pos 0.25 Comppol 1 to 4.33 (1 worst) 5-8 EBRD
Competition law passed? Pos 0.25 CmplwXE6 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Aver. degree of competition in
strat. & infrastructure sectors
Pos 0.25 CompetE1 0=none to 4=very
competitive
0-8 Survey
Monopoly commission? Pos 0.25 McommE12 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Capital markets Indicator Pos 0.17 IPIkm M0V1 0-8 Computed
General IAS in force? Pos 0.1 IASx 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 EBRD
Security market Indicator 0.25 Securmkt M0V1 0-8 Computed
Security markets index Pos 0.50 Securt 1 to 4.33 (1 worst) 5-8 EBRD
International corporate bond
issued?
Pos 0.25 Intlcbnd 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 EBRD
Is there a T-bill market? Pos 0.25 Tbills 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 EBRD
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Table 7 (cont’d): Policy and institutional reform indicators, 1990-1998.
Category Definition Effect Weight Variable Scoring Availability* Source
Stock market Indicator Pos 0.35 Istkmrk M0V1 0-8 Computed
Is there a stock market? Pos 0.3 Stockmkt 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Stock market capitalization / av. GDP Pos 0.5 SmkcGdp Percent 0-8 EBRD
Stock market activity (value of
trades/market cap.)
Pos 0.1 SmtrPoC2 Fraction 0-8 Survey
No. of transactions in stock market /
Ln(Pop)
Pos 0.1 SmtrpoC2 Number 0-8 Survey
Non-bank financial
institutions
Indicator Pos 0.25 Inbfin M0V1 0-8 Computed
Pensions Are there private pension funds? Pos    0.25 PrpenC11 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Competit’n Degree of competition in non-bank
financial sector
Pos    0.25 Compnbf 0=none to 4 very
competitive
0-8 Survey
Insurance Indicator Pos    0.5 Inbins M0V1 0-8 Computed
Private sector share of insurance
companies
Pos 0.2 InsprC76 Percent 0-8 Survey
No. of insurance firms/Ln(population) Pos 0.2 InscoPC6 number 0-8 Survey
Government a dominant firm in the
insurance sector?
Neg 0.2 InsgvC9 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
No. of foreign insurance companies /
Ln(population)
Pos 0.2 InsfgPC8 number 0-8 Survey
Has an insurance law been passed? Pos 0.2 InslwX 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Taxation Indicator Pos 0.17 IPItax M0V1 4-7 Computed
Collection Indicator Pos 0.5 Taxcoll M0V1 4-7 Computed
Tax revenue / GDP Pos 0.6 Taxrev Percent 4-8 EBRD
Tax arrears / total tax revenues Neg 0.1 Taxarr Percent 0-6 WB,EBRD
Collection ratio of social security tax Pos 0.3 EfSSCol Percent 0-7 EBRD
Sophistication Indicator Pos 0.3 Taxsoph M0V1 4-7 Computed
Is there a VAT? Pos 0.5 VAT 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 EBRD
Tariff revenue/tax revenue Neg 0.5 TrfTax Percent 0-8 EBRD
Tax reform# Has major tax reform occurred? Pos 0.2 TxrefG8 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Banking sector Indicator Pos 0.17 IPIbank M0V1 4-8 Computed
Competition Indicator Pos 0.7 Compbank M0V1 4-8 Computed
State banks’ percentage of assets Neg 0.2 Asobanks Percent 4-8 EBRD
Banking/interest rate index Pos 0.3 Bnkirlib 1to4.33 (1 worst) 4-8 EBRD
Competition in the banking sector Pos 0.25 ComBkE1j 0=none to 4 very
competitive
0-8 Survey
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Table 7 (cont’d): Policy and institutional reform indicators, 1990-1998.
Category Definition Effect Weight Variable Scoring Availability* Source
Competition (cont’d) No. of banks / Ln(population) Pos       0.15 BnksPop Number 0-8 EBRD
No. of foreign owned banks /
Ln(population)
Pos 0.1 FgnbnkPo Number 4-8 EBRD
Performance Indicator Pos 0.3 Perfbank M0V1 0-8 Computed
Domestic credit by banks / total
investment
Pos 0.4 CreddC12 Percent 0-7 Survey
Is there deposit insurance for banks? Pos 0.4 DinsC17 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Long-term lending to private sector /
private sector value added
Pos 0.2 LtprlC14 Percent 0-8 Survey
Land Privatization Indicator Pos 0.075 IPIland M0V1 0-8 Computed
Tradability restrictions Indicator Pos 0.8 Trdblty M0V1 0-8 Computed
Restrictions on sale of industrial land? Pos 0.50 LsaliA26 0-8 Survey
Restrictions on sale of agricultural
land?
Pos 0.25 LsalaA26 0-8 Survey
Restrictions on sale of residential
land?
Pos 0.25 LsalrA26 0-8 Survey






Trade Liberalization Indicator Pos 0.17 IPItrd M0V1 0-8 Computed
Regulatory environment Trade and exchange rate liberalization
index




Indicator Pos 0.25 Intlcmpl M0V1 0-8 Computed
Subscribe to Article 8? Pos 0.35 Art8 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 IMF
Member of WTO? Pos 0.35 WTO 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 IMF
Removal of state trading monopoly Pos 0.3 Trdmonop 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 Survey
Import barriers Indicator Pos 0.2 Impbarr M0V1 0-8 Computed
Tariff revenue / imports Neg 0.5 Tarrev Percent 0-8
Substantial removal of quantitative
restrictions on imports
Pos 0.5 Mqntyres 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 EBRD
Export promotion Indicator Pos 0.2 Xpromo M0V1 0-8 Computed
Substantial removal of quantitative
restrictions on exports
Pos 0.6 Xqntyres 1=Yes, 0=No 0-8 EBRD
Export credits as a % of total exports Pos 0.4 EcrdtExp Percent 0-7
Notes: See Table 6 for abbreviations.
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5.2 Other policy and institutional reforms
Here we construct and examine indicators of the components of the other, non-privatization,
USAID reform areas, which focus on policy and institutions. These include price and wage
liberalization, social safety net, tax reform, banking sector, capital markets, land privatization,
and trade liberalization. We first present the “recipes” for the sub-indicators. We then contrast
the resulting indicators in terms of inter- and intra-cluster differences.
5.2.1 Constructing indicators
In this sub-section we provide the “recipes” given in Table 7 for the indicators of the non-
privatization, USAID reform areas.
The social safety net indicator captures three aspects of the government’s attempt to
soften the negative social impacts of transition: unemployment, plant closure or worker redund-
ancy (retraining and severance payments), retirement (income support). Price liberalization
comprises not just liberalization in the prices of goods and service, but also liberalization of
wages and the degree of competition in the markets. The capital markets indicator comprises
sub-indicators for the stock market, securities market, and the non-bank financial institutions.
Tax reform includes not just improvements in the tax code but also in its administration. Thus,
this indicator includes components for the quality of tax collection efforts and the sophistication
of the tax system. By sophistication we refer to whether modern low-distortionary revenue
instruments are in place, as opposed to trade-distorting import tariffs and export taxes. The
banking sector indicator focuses on the degree of competition in the sector and the degree the
sector is providing economic agents with adequate credit and services. The land reform sub-
indicator concentrates on measuring the degree that land markets function in a way consistent
with the needs of a market economy. It also looks at the degree foreigner are excluded. Finally,
turning to trade liberalization, we capture tariff and non-tariff barriers and compliance with the
various international trade regimes on the import side and the degree there are restrictions or
even promotion on the export side.
5.2.2 Patterns of reform
Figure 17 presents a summary of overall progress in transition across the various clusters as well
as for their current position. To assist in the discussion, we provide a graph of inter-cluster
differences as typified by the reform trajectory and a graph of intra-cluster differences for 1998
(or 1997 for taxation, the latest year for which data are plentiful). Clearly all the clusters have
exhibited progress in their reform agendas. The EU Border States and the Baltics achieve the
greatest degree of progress, with Central Asia and Albania exhibiting the lowest. Let us turn to
within-cluster differences by 1998. Here the Baltics, the Caucasus and to a lesser extent the
Western FSU, the Balkans and the EU Border are tight. The EU Border States have clearly bifur-
cated, with the “new” states doing the least well in the cluster. Central Asia is also bifurcated
with Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic well above the rest of the cluster.
Now let us examine the reform trajectories and progress in transition according to each of
the sub-indicators developed in section 5.2.1.
The social safety net indicators are presented, for completeness, in Figure 18, yet due to
the scarcity of the variables that fit this category they should be interpreted with care.
Figure 19 presents the inter- and intra-cluster variation for the price and wage liberaliza-
tion indicator.16 This indicator should show a strong tendency to asymptote since there is only so
                                                
16 See Sachs (1997) for a discussion of the issues.
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much liberalization possible before being fully liberalized. As the figure confirms, we do see a
tendency to this effect with the EU Border States, Baltics and the Caucasus all converging to
similar (high) scores. Central Asia and the Balkans still have one standard deviation to go. The
Western FSU seems to have floundered after making very respectable progress during the first
three years of its transition. Albania started lower than the others (dropped from the figure to
avoid distortion of the scale), and made a huge jump in 1992. Notable at the country level are the
strong performances of the Czech Republic and Georgia (though special mention should be
given to Moldova and the Kyrgyz Republic for the best performance in their respective clusters).
The worst performer, Turkmenistan, was also shown in paper 2 of this series to be the least
competitive country in the sample. Finally, Macedonia’s very bad performance here sends a
signal to donors as to where their efforts need to focus.
Figure 20 presents the inter- and intra-cluster variation for the tax reform indicator.17 While
data limitations prevented this indicator from reaching back to the beginning of transition –
though the recent years are available here, it still has a story to tell. What is most surprising here
is the robust performance of the Western FSU, all the more so given the poor performances of
the rest of the FSU clusters. The Baltics and the EU Border States predictably turn in best scores.
Turning to the data for 1997, we see that the clusters are tight, with the exception of the EU
Border States. Here, in spite of its good performance on many of the other indicators, Slovenia is
dramatically lagging behind its cluster.
                                                
17 See McKinnon (1992) for a discussion of taxation issues in transition economies.
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Figure 17: Inter- and intra-cluster differences in overall progress in reforms over the transition
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Figure 18: Inter- and intra-cluster variation for the social safety net trajectory and 1998,
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Figure 19: Price and wage liberalization inter- and intra-cluster variation for the transition
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Figure 20: Tax reform inter- and intra-cluster variation for the transition period and 1997,
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Figure 21 presents the inter- and intra-cluster variation for banking sector reform.18
Again, we see that the Baltics and EU Border have the best performance. The Balkans and the
Western FSU (pulled up by pre-crisis-Russia) also weigh in with above-period-average scores.
Central Asia and the Caucasus show only moderate progress, while Albania seems to remain
static in this sector. The lower panel graph shows Hungary, Macedonia and the Kyrgyz Republic
all stand out in their respective clusters. Interestingly, in spite of the extremely impressive
foreign direct investment performance of Azerbaijan presented in the next chapter, it has the
worst banking sector performance in the Caucasus.
Figure 22 presents the inter- and intra-cluster variation for capital market reform. Here
the Western FSU, pulled by Russia, exhibit an impressive performance, as do the Baltics and the
EU Border States. In fact Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans all show almost unabated
improvements in this reform category. Note how all clusters, with the slight exception of the
Baltics begin transition at the same starting point. Oddly, in spite of such positive improvements
over the period, the clusters are not as tight as in the case of the other reforms. In the case of the
EU Border States, we see the not unusual occurrence that the countries bifurcate themselves into
“old” states and “new” states. The Central Asia cluster also bifurcates into polar extremes, with
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic showing above-average performance. Finally, Latvia,
Lithuania and Russia show good capital market performance by 1998.
Figure 23 presents the inter- and intra-cluster variation for land privatization. Here
Central Asia shows no interest in much reform. The EU Border States, though having the second
highest scores, reach this level already at the second year of transition. Both the Western FSU
and the Caucasus, though, do show much progress, even if they do not reach the scores of the
two front-runners. Turning to the intra-cluster 1998 data, we again see the “lumpiness” of the
data, with most clusters having the same best-score value. We also see very loose clustering here,
with the exception of Central Asia, where all countries score poorly. Noteworthy, though is the
very bad performance of the Czech Republic and Armenia. Hungary also is rather weak, given it
is a member of the EU Border States.
Figure 24 presents the inter- and intra-cluster variation for trade liberalization.19 With the
exception of Central Asia, most of the clusters seem to have taken trade liberalization seriously,
registering continuous improvements over the period. Having said this, the Baltics and the
Western FSU do seem to have hit a glass ceiling at around the third year of their respective
transitions. The lower panel confirms the seriousness the clusters have taken this reform, with
their 1998 values being very close together. While these are unquestionably the tightest
clusterings of the all our indicators, note that the same reform bifurcation seen above for Central
Asia also occurs here; Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic almost two standard deviations
better than the rest of the countries in their cluster. Belarus also belongs to this lower Central
Asia country sub-group. Finally, the worst trade liberalization performance is, again, the country
that scores worst on our paper-2 competitiveness indicator: Turkmenistan.
                                                
18 See McKinnon (1992) for a discussion of money and credit issues in transition economies.
19 See de Menil (1997), Bruno (1988) for discussions of trade liberalization in transition economies.
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Figure 21: Banking sector Inter- and intra-cluster variation for the transition period and 1998,
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Figure 22: Capital market reform inter- and intra-cluster variation for the transition period and
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Figure 23: Land privatization reform inter- and intra-cluster variation for the transition period
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Figure 24: Trade liberalization inter- and intra-cluster variation for the transition period and
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6 Economic performance during transition
The determinants of transition described above have a major impact on the way firms are run,
their ability to successfully develop and compete among themselves and, ultimately their chances
of becoming internationally competitive. But country competitiveness is not easily observable by
simply examining firm performance and is not assured through focussing on firm performance
alone. A country’s international competitiveness depends on the interactions and synergies
among firms in an industry and the positive externalities between industries. Moreover, during
transition, even those firms that are profitable may be so for the wrong reasons. Lack of competi-
tion, entry barriers, government restrictions, and other market distortions may mean that firm
profits are not derived from their ability to use inputs most efficiently.
For these and other reasons (such as lack of comprehensive firm data across countries) we
identify a number of micro, mezzo and macro economic variables that together better reflect the
progress in country competitiveness. We follow the approach taken in the rest of this study by
designing indicators in the interest of developing a coherent picture of country-level
performance. Of particular focus will be to examine a subset of performance variables most
related to the creation of an efficient, private sector economy. We do this in three ways. First, we
describe the variables that characterizes private sector activity. Second, we will present some key
medium-run, or what we called at the start of this chapter, “intermediate outcomes”. Third, we
will look at a limited number of variables that together characterize long-run economic
performance. In each case we first present the design of the relevant indicators and then use
graphs to show the inter- and intra-cluster differences over the transition period.
Finally, we will present the paths of the ratio of GDP per capita to its per transition level.
6.1 Constructing indicators of performance
In this section we provide the motivation and “recipes” for the indicators of economic perform-
ance of which there are three categories, private sector activity, medium-run activity, and long-
run performance.
One of the central challenges of the transition process is to create a vibrant private
sector.20 This requires transferring the ownership and use of society’s resources to private use.
Our Private Sector Activity indicator, therefore, includes measures of the amount of value added
due to private sector output as well as the amount of investment and credit going to private enter-
prise.
Besides private sector activity, medium-run performance needs to include micro-level
domestic activity and efficiency improvements embodied in the creation of de novo firms as well
as the activity of privatized firms.21 At the mezzo level it needs to include measures of interna-
tional performance and foreign sector participation in domestic markets. Finally, it should
include macro-economy aspects as capturing stability of prices and a low level of barter and
unofficial activity.
For exports we used an average of two alternative measures: balance of payments data
and trade authority data, corrected for country size (population). The theory behind this
                                                
20 See Earle et. al. (1993), Johnson et. al. (1995), Johnson et. al. (1997)
21 We could not obtain, so far, an adequate de novo firm creation series. Constructing such a series is an important
topic for further research.
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correction is that small countries tend to have higher trade intensities, not because of their
performance, as we want to capture it, but merely because of arbitrary borders (e.g., trade
between the U.S. states is not considered international trade but trade between European states
is). The correction is done by regressing trade per unit GDP for a sample of 200 countries against
the log of their population. We then use the coefficients obtained to predict the “expected” level
of exports a transition country should have, given its size. The difference between the actual and
expected levels of trade becomes one variable we use as a measure of exports. We also use an
additional measure: exports to non-transition countries (deflated by GDP). This is a better
measure of openness since it reflects mainly post-Soviet trade relations, as opposed to Soviet era
trade agreements.
For foreign sector participation in domestic markets we used FDI per capita.
The third component of the medium-run performance indicator captures improvements in
economic efficiency by comprising various measures of average productivity, including average
output per employed worker, average output per employed worker in industry, and the efficiency
of energy use.22
Our fourth component for the medium-term is macro performance. We capture this using
inflation, unemployment,23 monetarization of the economy, and credibility of the country’s inter-
national reserve position.24
Turning last to the long run, we address this aspect of economic performance indirectly
and directly. We first include real GDP per capita as an overall measure of the economy’s ability
to provide goods and services to the population. We then consider two sets of more direct
measures of well being. The first reflects material aspirations and includes narrow measures such
as telephones and televisions per capita as well as broad measures like private consumption per
capita and GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity.25 The second reflects non-
material, quality-of-life measures such as life expectancy and level of spending on health and
education.26
                                                
22 See Aghion et. al. (1996).
23 The unemployment variable is used to proxy for the rigidity of the labor market in the country. A high level of
unemployment may indicate the existence of rigidities that do not allow the market to arrive at equilibrium (market-
clearing). A low level of unemployment, on the other hand, also suggests labor rigidities since the high degree of
economic restructuring necessary in a transition economy should cause high unemployment to be observed. We,
therefore, chose to penalize a country for deviations from what we considered as a natural rate of employment,
outside the range 8-12 percent
24 See Fischer et. al. (1996)
25 This “ppp” GDP measure is not the same as our  real GDP, “indirect” measure. The former reflects all manner of
goods and services, regardless of whether supplied through the market or via non-market services. The latter reflects
only officially reported transactions. The reason the latter is still important is that it tends to better reflect economic
growth.
26 Note that while the UNDP’s “Human Development” indicator would be ideal to include here, it exists for to
limited a time period to be of use.
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Table 8: Economic reform indicators, 1990-1998
Category Definition Effect Weight Variable Scoring Availability* Source
Private sector activity Indicator Pos IPSA M0V1 0-8 Computed
Private sector value added per capita Pos 0.6 PrGdpPop USD 0-8 EBRD
Private sector investment per capita Pos 0.2 PrinvPop USD 0-7 WB
Private sector credit / population Pos 0.2 PrcrdPop USD 0-8 WB
Medium run performance Indicator Pos Iperfmed M0V1 0-8 Computed
Exports Indicator Pos 0.25 IExp M0V1 0-8 Computed
Exports to non transition countries,
as a % of GDP
Pos 0.5 ExpNTr Percent 0-7 WDI,
EBRD
Exports as % of GDP (size adjusted) Pos 0.5 ExpRel Percent 0-8 WDI,
EBRD
Foreign direct investment Indicator Pos 0.25 IFdi M0V1 0-8 Computed
FDI per capita Pos 1 FdiPop USD 0-8 EBRD
Productive efficiency Indicator 0.25 Iprdneff M0V1 0-7 Computed
Labor productivity in industry Pos 0.5 APLind % of 90 0-8 EBRD
GDP to energy ratio Pos 0.25 Gdpenrgy USD/kw 0-6 WDI
GDP/employment Pos 0.25 GdpLab USD 0-7 EBRD
Macro-economy Indicator Pos 0.25 IMacro M0V1 0-8 Computed
Ln of Inflation rate(in absolute value) Neg 0.4 LnInflat number 0-8 EBRD
Unemployment rate (deviation from
8-12 range)
Neg 0.2 UnempDev percent 0-8 EBRD
International reserves as a % of
imports
Pos 0.2 RsrvImp fraction 0-7 EBRD
Monetarization Pos 0.2 M2Gdp fraction 0-8 EBRD
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Table 8 (cont’d): Economic reform indicators, 1990-1998
Category Definition Effect Weight Variable Scoring Availability* Source
Long run performance Indicator Pos n.a. Iperflgn M0V1 0-7 Computed
Output Real GDP per capita Pos 0.5 Ypc_r US dollars 0-8 EBRD
Population well-being Indicator Pos 0.5 Welbeing M0V1 0-7 Computed
Consumption Indicator Pos    0.7 Consump M0V1 0-7 Computed
GNP per capita (adjusted for PPP) Pos 0.35 Gnpcppc USD 0-7 WDI
Television sets per 1000 people Pos 0.10 Telev Number 0-6 WDI
Telephone lines per 100 people Pos 0.10 Teleph Number 0-8 WDI,
EBRD
Vehicles per 1000 people Pos 0.10 Vhcls Number 0-7 WDI
Private consumption per capita Pos 0.35 PrconPop USD 0-6 WDI
Health Indicator Pos    0.3 Health M0V1 0-8 Computed
Life expectancy at birth Pos 0.5 Lifeexp Years 0-8 WDI
Expenditures on health and
education per capita
Pos 0.5 hedexppc USD 0-8 EBRD
Notes: See notes at the end of table 6 for abbreviations.
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6.2 Patterns in private sector activity
The inter- and intra-cluster performance of our private sector activity indicator as presented in
Figure 25 reveals a somewhat sanguine situation. All clusters but Central Asia show some
increasing trend in their transition period performance. While the EU Border States started out at
almost period-average performance, it achieved within six years a level of performance equal to
1.5 to 2 standard deviations above the other clusters, except for the Baltics that are one standard
deviation below. The Western FSU has struggled to achieve by the sixth year of transition a level
of private sector activity only equal to the period average for the sample, and has experienced a
certain decline in 1998. The Caucasus display especially disappointing results along the period.
Figure 25 also provides insight driving these results by showing individual country
performance differences for 1998. With the exception of the Western FSU, we see a fairly tight
cluster fit. The Czech Republic and Slovenia are the best in the sample. Estonia and Russia
come out best in their respective clusters, as does Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic in
Central Asia (which are also the most competitive in their cluster).
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Figure 25: Inter- and intra-cluster differences in private sector activity for transition period and
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6.3 Patterns of medium-term performance
Here we consider the inter- and intra-cluster differences in performance as measured by exports,
foreign direct investment, productive efficiency, and the macro-economy. Then we present the
same comparisons for the summary medium-term indicator, itself. Note that in the two graphs
presented for each sub-indicator the top one refers to years into transition while the bottom one is
for 1997 or 1998. Since countries were at different points in their transition cycle in either of
these two years, the two graphs are not directly comparable.
Export differences in performance are presented in Figure 26. Here we find that non of
the clusters show improving performance over the transition period, with the latter starting (and
ending) at a much lower point. Central Asia and the Caucasus, and to a lesser degree the Baltics,
exhibiting a tendency of deteriorating export performance over the period. Turning to the lower
graph panel, we see that the clusters lose their tightness. Poland and Croatia do the worst in their
cluster. Estonia once again performs best in its cluster, as does Belarus (perhaps due to its trade
with Russia), Tajikistan and Bulgaria.
Differences in foreign direct investment are presented in Figure 27. Here we find that it is
the Caucasus (driven by Azerbaijan as the lower graph illustrates) the Baltics and the Western
FSU who are the best clusters. The Western FSU and the Balkans, though both starting from the
same initial point as the Caucasus, show very tepid improvements and do not even achieve
average performance by the end of the period. Central Asia, while reaching period average
performance levels early on, are unable to progress further over the transition period. Hungary,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Lithuania outperform their clusters by far, the latter being the best in
the sample. All other non Baltic FSU countries, the Balkans and Slovenia score poorly.
A comparison of performance of productive efficiency is presented in Figure 28. The best
performance is from the EU Border States. Here we find all the FSU clusters, save the Baltics,
turning in weak performance with hardly a tendency to increase, with Albania facing a collapse
in 1997. Looking at the lower panel and the 1997 within-cluster differences, we see that with the
exception of Slovenia and Russia who score relatively well, the clusters again exhibit a tight fit.
Slovenia is again the best performance of the entire sample.
Figure 29 illustrates the performance differences with respect to the macro-economy.
Again clusters are adequately tight. Here we see that all the clusters have improved their
performance over the transition period. Moreover, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Albania, and to a
lesser extent the EU Border States all experienced troughs in their macro performance from
which they then recovered. The Balkans experienced a second decline after the 6th year. The best
country performers are both halves of Czechoslovakia and Azerbaijan. Note how Bulgaria is the
odd man out in the Balkans, and so is Turkmenistan in Central Asia.
These various intermediate outcome variables can be aggregated into a single indicator of
medium-term performance. This summary indicator is presented in Figure 30. All clusters, with
the exception of the Caucasus and Albania, show trend improvement over the period, albeit from
different starting points and with different growth. Albania’s early gains are lost in 1996 and
1997 though. The Baltics and the EU Border States are the clear best performers. Looking at the
within-cluster differences we see that the resulting clusters for 1997 are extremely tight, with the
exception of the EU Border States, where Slovenia turns in the best performance.
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Figure 26: Export sector (medium-term) performance trajectory over the transition period, and
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Figure 27: Foreign direct investment (medium-term) performance trajectory over the transition
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Figure 28: Productive efficiency performance (medium-term) trajectory over the transition
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Figure 29: Macro-economy (medium-term) performance trajectory over the transition period,
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Figure 30: Aggregate medium-term performance indicator trajectory over the transition period,
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6.4 Patterns of long-term performance
No study on patterns would be complete without a presentation of the GDP path. Thus, in Figure
31 we show the path of real GDP (as a percentage of the pre-transition, 1989 level)  over the
transition period by cluster. Here we see that all clusters go through 3 to 5 years of negative
growth at the start of transition. The EU Border States, Baltics and the Caucasus appear to have
reached positive rates of growth. The Western FSU, the Balkans and Central Asia seem to have
climbed out of the period of deep negative growth and now have to concentrate on making
growth positive.
GDP growth, however, is an admittedly narrow view of long-term performance. For this
reason we develop the additional long-run performance indicator to help create a wider picture.
As shown in Figure 32, our long-run performance indicator trajectories exhibit tight clustering
and suggest a similar story to that of medium-term performance. Many clusters experience a
“dip” in their performance, no doubt reflecting the short-term performance losses associated with
the initial trauma of changing economic regimes at the start of transition. While the EU Border
States end best, they also started in the most favorable position. The Baltics, on the other hand,
start well below average but manage to turn in second-best long-term performance scores.
Slovenia, as it did in the medium run, also has the best long-run performance of the sample.
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Figure 31: Real GDP per capita as a percent of 1989 over the transition period, and within-
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Figure 32: Aggregate long-term performance indicator trajectory over the transition period, and
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Data sources for initial conditions
Table 9: Data sources for initial conditions.
Source Variables
WDI – World development
indicators, World Bank:
Resource balance, Domestic absorption, Gross domestic
savings, Physicians, Domestic investment, Vehicles, Televi-
sions, Telephone lines, Commercial energy use, Electricity
consumption, Infant mortality, Life expectancy, Hospital
beds, Private consumption, Paved roads, Birth rate, Popula-
tion growth, Urbanization, Consumption, Public health
expenditures, Fixed domestic investment, Share of services
in GDP, GNP per capita 89,PPP adjusted, Working age
population, Energy imports, Fertility rate, urban population
growth, working age population, old population
De Melo, Denziger, Gelb and
Tenev, Circumstance and
Choice, World Bank, 1997
Natural resource abundance, Share of industry in GDP,
Black market premium, Industrial overload, Trade, Share of
agriculture in GDP, first principal component, second
principal component, Income per capita, 1987-1990




Education index, School participation, Human development
index
National authorities & IMF staff GDP Growth, 1990 inflation, Government expenditures
Growth file, Sachs/Amar, HIID Distance to major ports, Landlocked population
Fischer, Sahay, Vegh, (1996) Share of exports to CMEA countries
World Bank % Muslims, % Christians, % Orthodox, Government reven-
ues
Freedom House Democratic rights index
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A1. Cluster means and standard deviations of initial conditions










































Mean 1016.66 1760.00 1340.00 1640.00 1862.50 3320.67 5007.00 2379.48
Std. Dev. 172.70 55.68 130.77 274.76 278.21 367.65 1519.88
Mean 88.17 40.33 69.67 88.00 67.50 10.33 0.00 49.92
Std. Dev. 11.70 24.66 18.88 41.32 17.90 0.00 40.02
Mean 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.52
Std. Dev. 0.41 0.58 0.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.77
Mean 36.64 32.18 *58.02 -0.82 55.10 58.28 3.78 *35.23
Std. Dev. 25.69 34.21 13.37 48.48 37.95 16.51 34.48
Mean *2.00 *0.49 *-4.30 -2.78 *-6.41 *-15.19 *-4.67
Std. Dev. 3.55 3.16 5.75 5.28 5.57 7.70
Mean 220.27 49.20 14.00 15.00 4.62 7.13 3.78 63.40
Std. Dev. 273.38 62.32 7.95 0.67 3.55 0.70 155.54
Mean *71.27 77.91 71.25 79.02 72.66 *69.63 *84.71 *75.25
Std. Dev. 3.59 1.35 8.79 3.06 7.71 9.71 7.62
Mean 1.23 0.70 1.98 3.60 4.12 1.97 4.06 2.47
Std. Dev. 1.15 1.80 1.42 1.58 1.02 1.32 1.81
Mean *97.99 *99.51 104.31 102.78 *106.41 *115.19 *104.67
Std. Dev. 3.55 3.15 5.74 5.28 5.57 7.70
Mean *32.92 *30.44 29.87 28.94 *31.67 *17.51 *28.19
Std. Dev. 6.56 1.32 7.01 8.99 6.30 8.14
Gross domestic savings 
(% of GDP), 89
Domestic absorption (% 
of GDP), 89
% of population within 
100 km from 
Average growth 85-89 
(%)
Total consumption (% of 
GDP), 90
Inflation (%), 90




Distance of capital to 
major port (km)
Energy imports (% of 




















Mean *47.33 *52.30 62.10 *37.77 *46.93
Std. Dev. 6.03 19.23 6.12 10.86
Mean 124.62 558.67 1828.00 434.00 1828.00 1828.00 1828.00 1211.11
Std. Dev. 105.49 470.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 795.05
Mean 2.62 15.60 25.70 4.30 25.70 25.70 25.70 18.09
Std. Dev. 10.88 3.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.41
Mean 0.44 0.34 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36
Std. Dev. 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.07
Mean *17.92 12.55 14.55 18.52 21.32 *14.27 *18.70 *17.15
Std. Dev. 4.99 6.06 5.55 2.99 5.71 8.74 5.84
Mean 46.83 49.00 48.33 48.00 35.00 36.66 37.40 42.32
Std. Dev. 18.32 12.12 4.72 0.00 6.48 13.61 3.78 11.90
Mean 1.82 2.06 2.08 2.13 2.51 4.10 *2.50
Std. Dev. 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.35 0.88 0.96
Mean 71.29 71.17 70.57 72.48 70.04 71.26 67.73 70.32
Std. Dev. 1.06 1.44 0.80 1.27 0.92 1.56 1.79
Mean 57.98 58.88 70.19 35.52 63.35 59.05 42.72 56.59
Std. Dev. 5.53 6.60 1.88 11.43 7.20 9.33 11.69
Mean 0.64 0.33 1.34 3.40 1.61 1.28 2.13 1.33
Std. Dev. 0.40 0.91 0.66 0.81 0.17 0.34 0.90
Mean 12.60 26.00 13.87 30.80 *14.2 22.07 38.74 *22.02
Std. Dev. 3.24 11.18 0.85 3.17 3.60 10.99 11.93
Mean 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.48
Std. Dev. 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05
Mean 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.64 0.57 0.64
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04
Mean 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.09
Std. Dev. 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Mean 0.08 -0.40 0.75 2.89 0.60 0.84 2.24 0.82
Std. Dev. 0.29 0.79 0.23 0.15 0.30 0.77 1.05
Mean 6.28 4.95 2.56 3.35 *2.70 *2.97 4.18 *4.28
Std. Dev. 1.84 2.67 0.49 0.24 0.05 0.64 1.90
Government revenues 
(% of GDP), 89
Urban population growth 
(%), 89
Population growth, 89
Working age population 
(% of total population), 
Infant mortality rate (per 
1,000), 89
Old population (% of 
total population), 90
Public Health 
expenditures (% of 




Black market premium 
(%), 90
Urban population (% of 
total population), 89
Life expectancy at birth, 
89
Fertility rate (births per 
women), 89
Demographics    
and Health
Share of services in 
GDP, 90
Government 






Expenditures (% of 















Mean *57.33 55.77 *106.95 38.10 70.83 *83.5 70.27
Std. Dev. 6.23 13.49 14.50 29.84 3.11 23.23
Mean 9.35 8.07 30.73 2.30 27.95 24.50 23.76 19.16
Std. Dev. 4.20 6.37 3.29 11.49 7.53 5.94 11.13
Mean 3827.84 *3536.43 3664.16 967.17 4000.78 2728.88 3132.15 *3410
Std. Dev. 1007.46 1038.58 575.07 1544.22 81.52 1561.37 1218.48
Mean 7.62 8.45 12.68 4.03 13.07 9.41 12.03 10.15
Std. Dev. 1.43 1.92 1.24 0.10 0.71 1.10 2.77
Mean 77.12 *75.25 49.00 *85.00 *96.5 73.84 *75.11
Std. Dev. 19.89 23.12 34.29 9.92 3.82 12.69 21.22
Mean 143.08 163.00 215.00 12.20 134.50 114.60 65.26 128.51
Std. Dev. 47.24 70.87 15.13 20.42 37.26 13.18 60.53
Mean 0.47 0.54 0.45 0.37 0.45 0.47 0.35 0.44
Std. Dev. 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.09
Mean 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.12 -0.01 0.08
Std. Dev. 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08
Mean 3025.44 2359.07 *1981.81 759.13 4715.21 2425.61 6289.28 *3647
Std. Dev. 1385.19 1549.53 2381.71 2764.98 1614.88 9030.24 4371.49
Mean 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.30 0.19
Std. Dev. 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.09
Mean 7255.17 3954.67 7973.33 1400.00 6270.00 5246.67 3658.00 5593
Std. Dev. 1517.58 906.08 1345.52 1361.15 543.54 998.13 2111.82
Mean *6827.5 *4665 5546.67 5105.00 5053.33 3490.00 *5062
Std. Dev. 1965.41 586.90 162.58 1246.23 744.13 1021.98 1545.67
Mean 217.19 119.58 168.32 11.36 *58.72 54.74 *40.58 *120.02
Std. Dev. 51.71 45.89 38.52 5.16 51.36 35.50 83.62
Mean *309.24 *224.55 353.36 85.13 316.20 203.33 214.59    *260.46
Std. Dev. 102.18 36.35 12.31 42.76 6.77 41.99 81.92
Mean *53.66 *60.18 54.88 62.25 *52.89 *65.54      *57.58
Std. Dev. 5.33 1.88 2.58 13.78 10.96 8.87
Hospital beds (per 
1,000), 90
Paved roads (%), 90
Share of Industry in 
GDP, 90
Share of Agriculture in 
GDP, 90
Income per capita, 89
Vehicles (per 1,000), 90
Private consumption (% 
of GDP), 89
Wealth
Television sets (per 
1,000), 90





Exports to CMEA (% 0f 
GDP), 90
Trade (% of GDP), 90
Industrial-
ization
Telephone lines (per 
1000), 89
Commercial energy use 
(kg oil equivalent per 
Industrial overhang, 90
Electricity Consumption 
(kwh per capita), 89
Infrastructure
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Table 10 (continued)















Mean 71.50 62.67 69.67 59.00 75.25 73.00 75.60 71.32
Std. Dev. 4.59 3.06 2.52 5.74 4.58 8.23 6.76
Mean 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.76 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.89
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Mean 0.85 0.77 0.74 0.66 0.71 0.64 0.64 0.73
Std. Dev. 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.09
Mean *2.47 *4.7 4.29 4.61 3.58 *3.88
Std. Dev. 1.00 0.17 0.33 1.05 0.44 0.88
Mean 43.17 44.00 51.00 47.00 67.75 70.33 71.00 57.12
Std. Dev. 2.23 2.65 0.00 11.21 0.58 0.00 13.31
Mean 24.33 18.66 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 9.88
Std. Dev. 20.21 22.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.87
Mean 39.00 14.00 25.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 26.04
Std. Dev. 18.48 24.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.46
Mean *30.91 *29.95 34.17 31.72 *30.65 *38.08 *32.7 *32.56
Std. Dev. 5.59 4.47 1.51 4.51 14.26 3.32 5.29
Mean *22.32 19.23 25.17 21.60 *34.00 *23.84
Std. Dev. 6.71 2.36 3.13 5.84 14.63 7.00
Mean 0.45 13.97 0.00 80.00 2.83 34.80 75.40 24.69
Std. Dev. 0.70 14.74 0.01 5.65 51.05 17.47 35.82
Mean 71.85 4.37 71.00 7.00 3.85 0.33 1.00 27.42
Std. Dev. 14.30 5.49 17.69 6.80 0.58 2.24 34.96
Mean 27.70 81.67 29.00 13.00 93.33 64.87 23.60 47.88
Std. Dev. 14.39 11.49 17.69 7.73 50.82 15.47 34.43
Mean -1.27 -0.76 0.44 -1.12 0.81 0.88 1.11 0.07
Std. Dev. 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.35 0.11 0.11 1.02
Mean 0.62 0.31 1.10 -1.15 0.31 0.44 -0.73 0.23











investment (% of GDP), 
Education index, 98




Gross domestic fixed 
investment (% of GDP), 
Human development 
index, 95




de Melo et.al. 
principal 
components 
Culture Christians (% of 
population)
Orthodox (% of 
population)
Muslims (% of 
population)
Years under central 
planning
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A5. Names and addresses of foreign institute collaborators
COUNTRY CONTACT
INSTITUTION
CONTACT NAME PHONE FAX ADDRESS
Albania Albanian Center for
Economic Research
Mr Zef Preci (355-38) 2020 344 Tel/fax: (355-
42)25021
A. Frasheri Street, Bldg. no.4, 3rd
Entrance, Apt. 24, Albania
Armenia Individual Mr. Artashes Kazakhetsyan (3742) 26-8423 n.a. 6 Sose Str., apt.# 14, Yerevan 375019,
Armenia








Ms. Nezhdana Bukova Tel: (375 17) 228-18-
38
375 17- 222-74-40 Partizanskyj Prospect 6-A, 3rd floor,
Minsk 220033, BELARUS
Bulgaria Center for Economic
Development
Ms. Diana Christozova 359-2-963-43-05 359-2-963-46-69  1Bulgaria Sq, NDK Administrative
Building, Fl. 11, 1463 Sofia, Bulgaria
Croatia Institute for International
Relations
Ms. Nevenka Cuckovic Tel: +385-1-4826-522 385-1-4828-361 Lj. F. Vukotinovica 2/2, 10 000 Zagreb,
Croatia




Mr. Jan Hanousek tel: ++420-2-240 05
174
420-2-242 27 143 Politickych veznu 7, PO Box 882, 111 21
Prague 1, Czech Republic
Estonia Hansabank Markets Mr. Urmas Riiel Tel: 372 6 131 664 372-613-1545 Liivalaia 8, 15040 Tallinn, Estonia
Georgia Georgian Center for
Transition Economic and
Sustainable Development
Mr. Revaz Cheishvili (995-32) 33-70-42
office, 22-62-33 home
995-32-932414 4 K. Gamsakhurdia Av.,  Tbilisi,
Republic of Georgia
Hungary GKI Economic Research
Co.








Ms. Gulia Yessengali 7-3272-631-472 tel/fax: 7-3272-
631289





Ms. Chynar Meimanalieva Tel: (996-312)66-11-
52 (office), 42-51-
12(home),
996-312-62-06-69 Mikrorayon 10, dom 9, kvartira 17,
Bishkek720 023, Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia Hansabank Markets Mr. Urmas Riiel Tel: 372 6 131 664 372-613-1545 Liivalaia 8, 15040 Tallinn, Estonia
Lithuania Hansabank Markets Mr. Urmas Riiel Tel: 372 6 131 664 372-613-1545 Liivalaia 8, 15040 Tallinn, Estonia
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COUNTRY CONTACT
INSTITUTION
CONTACT NAME PHONE FAX ADDRESS




Ms. Elena Kishlaru, Director Tel: (3732) 24-52-11
(office), 29-23-21
(home)
3732-24-54-53 ASEM, Banulescu-Bodoni Street, 59,
block B, Chisinau-2005, MOLDOVA
Poland Agencja Rynku Rolnego Mr. Jacek Bukowski tel.   +48 22 623 1078,
or 48-501-499-059
48-22 -623 1452 00930 Warszawa, ul. Wspolna 30,
Poland
Romania Individual Ms. Alina Andrei 40.1.315.10.03 n.a. Str. Paris nr. 45, ap. 10, Bucharest,
Romania
Russia SKATE Mr. Alex Vasiliev 7-095-7847-188 5 Gaziyetnii Pereulok Moscow 103918,
Russia
Slovakia M.E.S.A.10 Mr. Martin Strieborny tel +421-7-54435328 421-7-54432189 Hviezdoslavovo nam c.17, 81102
Bratislava, Slovakia
Slovenia CEEPN (Central and
Eastern European
Network)
Mr. Marko Simoneti tel.: (386 61)1683 396 386 61-346 660 Dunajska 104, 1001 Ljubljana, PO Box
2518 , Slovenia
Tajikistan Asia Plus Info Agency Mr. Zafar Abdulloev (3772) 510136 7-3772-217-863 35/1 Bokhtar street 8th floor, Dushanbe,
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan Individual Mr. Ruben Agajanov (993 12) 51 23 60 993 12- 51 19 96 2 Pomma St., Dept. of State Property,
Ministry of Economy, Ashgabat 744000,
Turkmenistan
Ukraine HIID Mr. Volodymyr Dubrovsky Tel: (380-44) 228-
1349, 228-8660, 462-
0792, 229-5467






Ms. Irina Avakyan (998-712) 65-16-54
(office), 90-23-60
(home)
998-712- 653-245 B 49/45, Kyuluk-5, Tashkent 700198,
Uzbekistan
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A6. Field survey questionnaire
Section A: Privatization
PERFORMANCE
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1 Enterprises converted to joint stock company Number of firms
2a Enterprises prepared for privatization, of which Number of firms
b Small (specify) Number of firms
c Medium (specify) Number of firms
d Large (specify) Number of firms
e Very large (specify) Number of firms
3a Privatizations completed, total, of which Number of firms
b Small (specify) Number of firms
c Medium (specify) Number of firms
d Large (specify) Number of firms
e Very large (specify) Number of firms
4 Privatizations completed, (from question 3), of which
a Public auction Number of firms
b Public tender (including investment funds) Number of firms
c Direct sales, total Number of firms
d Direct sales to foreign investors Number of firms
e MEBO Number of firms
f Restitution Number of firms
g Other methods (excluding bankruptcy) Number of firms
5 Bankruptcies and liquidations in privatization process
a Number filed Number of firms
b Bankruptcies, liquidations, dissolved (completed) Number of firms
6 Number of firms included in the voucher (mass) program Number of firms
7 Share of SOE equity distributed through voucher program Percent by 1998
8 Share of privatized capital value that is: Percent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
a sold to foreign investors Percent
b sold to managers/employees Percent
c sold to other domestic investors Percent
n.a. Sales revenues and commitments
9 Privatization revenues Local currency
10 Privatization revenues US dollars
11 Value of investor investment commitments/social outlays Local currency
12     a Strategic and infrastructure privatizations, total Number of firms
b            of which:                                                   Banking Number of firms
c Energy Number of firms
d Water Number of firms
e Gas Number of firms
f Telecom Number of firms
g Railroads, airlines, transport Number of firms
h Insurance/non-financial Number of firms
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No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
13a Enterprises in which State has control (>33% ownership) Number of firms
b Small (specify) Number of firms
c Medium (specify) Number of firms
d Large (specify) Number of firms
e Very large (specify) Number of firms
14 Enterprises in which managers/workers have control (>33%) Number of firms
15 Enterprises in which foreign investors have control (>33%) Number of firms
n.a. Property privatizations
16 Number of farm privatizations In thousands
17 Percent of total farms remaining in state hands Percent
18 Land area privatized Thousands of hectares
19 Percentage of arable land privatized Percent
20 Residences (apartments, houses, etc.) privatized Thousands of units
21 Percent of total residency units in state hands Percent
22a Number of workers in enterprises at the moment of privatization Thousands
b of which:                    workers from direct sales privatizations Thousands
c workers from auctions Thousands
d workers from public tenders Thousands
e workers from MEBO Thousands
23a Number of workers in firms privatized in previous years, total Thousands
b of which:                    workers from direct sales privatizations Thousands
c workers from auctions Thousands
d workers from public tenders Thousands
e workers from MEBO Thousands
POLICY
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
24 What is the main reason privatization
didn’t go more quickly?
0=Government didn’t want to, 1=insufficient
political support, 2=lack of implementation
resources, 3=lack of skills/knowledge, 4= weak
investor demand, 5=other (and indicate reason)
25 For each year, describe how
foreigners were allowed to own land
0=Not allowed, 1=only as a minority owner,
2=Yes, with restrictions, 3=Yes, no restrictions
26 Are there restrictions on the sale of
previously privatized land?
a Industrially zoned land
b Agriculturally zoned land
c Residentially zoned land
0=Not allowed, 1=minor restrictions, 2=major
restrictions
INSTITUTIONS
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
27 Number of employees in privatization agencies (national & local) Thousands of  persons
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Section B: Firm creation/destruction (restructuring)
PERFORMANCE
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1a Registered firms, total In thousands
b of which:  State-owned enterprises In thousands
c of which, Majority-owned In thousands
d                  Privately owned In thousands
e of which, Foreign controlled Number
f                  Insider-controlled (e.g. MEBO) Number
2 Registered firms, total (from line 1),
a of which:                                         Small In thousands
b medium In thousands
c large In thousands
d very large Number
3a Number of private firms before transition, total In thousands
b of which:                                Small In thousands Give reference year:
4a Enterprise arrears, total, of which
b to workers Local currency
c to government (taxes, fees, social security, etc) Local currency
d to utilities (energy, water, etc) US dollars
e to banks US dollars
f to other enterprises (SOEs and private sector) Local currency
5 Number of bankruptcies/liquidations filed Number
6 Number of bankruptcies/liquidations completed Number
7 Number of bankruptcies not from privatization process (specify
in “Notes-respondent” whether refers to filed or completed)
Number
8 Share of GDP (value added) in service sector Percent
INSTITUTIONS
No. Item Possible response Answer
9 Since when are there special bankruptcy courts? Year or “None”
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
10 Number of firms receiving direct assistance from government-
subsidized SME programs. If number not available, then
indicate the years such a program was in operation.
Number of firms. Or place “X” in
years program operated
OTHER
No. Item Possible responses 2nd  year of transition 5th year of transition 1999
11 For each period, indicate the major obstacles to firm creation
a Biggest obstacle
b 2nd biggest obstacle
0=credit, 1= corruption, 2= lack of demand, 3=
government fees and regulations, 4= poor
infrastructure, 5= other (indicate obstacle)
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Section C: Capital markets, insurance and banking
PERFORMANCE
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
n.a. Stock market
1a Volume of shares traded, end-of-year Number of shares
b Value of shares traded, end-of-year Local currency, mlns
2 Number of transactions made, end-of-year Number of trades
3 Market capitalization, end-of-year Local currency, mlns
4 Number of shares existing, end-of-year Thousands
5 Number of firms listed, end-of-year Number of firms
n.a. Insurance markets
6 Number of insurance companies Number
7 Number of private insurance companies Number
8 Number of private foreign insurance companies Number
9 Is the government company the dominant firm? Y=yes, N=no
n.a. Pension funds
10 Working age population with a pension Thousands
11 Are there private pension funds? Y=yes, N=no
n.a. Banking
12 Ratio of domestic credit to GDP Percent
13 Share of domestic credit going to private sector Percent
14 Long-term lending to private sector US dollars
15 Number of long-term loans to private sector Number
POLICY
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
16 When was the insurance law passed? Year or “None”
17 Has there been deposit insurance? “X” in year(s) or “None” in 1999
18 Share of state bank enterprise lending on less than
commercial terms
Percent
19 Current account convertibility 0=Limited, 1=Full
INSTITUTIONS
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
20 Since when is there a housing mortgage market? “X” in year(s) or “None” in 1999
21 Has the insurance sector undergone major restructuring? “X” in year(s) or “None” in 1999
22 Since when is there a regulatory agency for insurance? “X” in year(s) or “None” in 1999





24 In what year did the country begin having a two-tier
banking system?
Year or, if <1980 then “1980”
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Section D: Trade and investment
PERFORMANCE





1 What have been the main sectors receiving FDI:
a Biggest share
b 2nd biggest share
c 3rd biggest share
I=infrastructure, B=banking, A=agriculture, L=light
manufacturing, H=heavy manufacturing, E=energy,
T=tourism, N=natural resources/forestry
2 What has been the primary purpose of FDI in these periods? 0=Domestic sales, 1=Production for export,
2=assembly/re-export, 3=other (specify)
3 Main channel for FDI in each period P=privatization, G=greenfield, X=purchase of existing
private firm, J=joint venture
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
4 Private sector share of gross domestic investment Percent
5 Foreign-owned share of banking sector assets Percent
6a Number of infrastructure firms, total (indicating the number of
which with foreign ownership participation)




f Railroads, airlines, transport
g Insurance/non-financial




No. Item Possible responses Answer
7 How many “Western” investments in excess of US$5 million
were in operation in 1988?
Number
8 Value of foreign-owned assets in 1988 US dollars
INSTITUTIONS
No. Item Possible responses Answer
9 When did the State export market board/agency lose its monopoly on major export sectors? Year
OTHER
10 For the period 1997-8, select
from the list of a) to p) the three
biggest obstacles to greater
foreign investment in the country.
Possible responses:
a Biggest obstacle Biggest obstacle:
b Second-biggest obstacle 2nd biggest obstacle:
c Third-biggest obstacle
a) Excessive tax burden b)Political instability c) Unclear, changing, or arbitrary regulatory environment d) Inadequate
banking infrastructure e) Poor marketing/distribution channels f) Poor physical infrastructure (ports, telecoms, roads,
elect/water etc.) g) Profit repatriation restrictions/capital controls h) Threat of inflation i) Negative government attitude
toward FDI j) Currency risk k) Weak/uncertain contract enforcement l) Corruption m) Poorly qualified or disciplined labor
force (lack of management skills) n) Land ownership restrictions or weak property rights protection o) Difficulty in import
/export (due to customs handling or trade restrictions) p) Other (specify in answer)
3rd biggest obstacle:
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Section E: Competition, productivity and labor
PERFORMANCE
No. Item Units 1st  year of transition Transition years 4-5 1998-1999
1 Is there competition in the strategic and infrastructure sectors?





















1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
2 Difference between bank lending and borrowing
rates (indicate exact rates in “Notes-respondent”)
Percentage
points
3 Unemployment rate (from a non-government source) Percent
4a Labor force, total In thousands
b employed by government In thousands
c employed by cooperative In thousands
d employed by private sector In thousands
e employed by mixed entities In thousands
5 Non-state (non-government) sector employment In thousands
POLICY
No. Item Possible responses Answer
6 When was the law on competition passed? Year or “None”
2nd  year of transition 5th year of transition 1999
7 Are there wage controls (e.g., minimum wage)? Y=yes, N=no
8 Describe mandatory employer payroll tax contribution (highest rate, if more
than one)
Indicate rate or fixed contribution
9 Describe mandatory employee payroll tax contribution (highest rate, if
more than one)
Indicate rate or fixed contribution
10 Describe the restrictiveness of hiring and firing regulations 0=minimal, 1=moderate, 2=very restrictive
INSTITUTIONS
No. Item Possible responses 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
11 Number of workers passing through government-
subsidized retraining program. If number not available,
then indicate years in which there was a  program.
Thousands or “X” in years a program
existed or “None” in 1990
No. Item Possibilities Answer
12 When was an anti-monopoly or competition commission or regulatory body established? Year or “None”
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Section F: Social safety net and rule of law
PERFORMANCE
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1 Persons receiving unemployment compensation
(otherwise indicate the years in which there was a
functioning program, national or local)
Number (or place “X” in
years with a program)
2 Workers receiving early retirement benefits
(otherwise indicate the years in which there was a
functioning program, national or local)
Number (or place “X” in
years with a program)
3 Workers receiving severance payments (otherwise
indicate the years in which there was a functioning
program, national or local)
Number (or place “X” in
years with a program)
4 Provide measure of dispersion of household





5 Number of sitting judges Number
6 Number of lawyers “on the bar”. If unavailable,





No. Item Possible response 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
7 Share of state budget to health and education Percent
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Section G: Fiscal reform
PERFORMANCE
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1a Number of central government-paid government
employees
Number
b of which:                              Number in Ministry of
Finance
Number
c Number in Ministry of Industry, Mining, and Energy Number
2 Number of prosecutions initiated for profit (or








3 Date of promulgation of property value tax Year or “None”
4 Date of local public finance reform/law Year or “None”
5 Date of promulgation of corporate income tax Year or “None”
6 Date of promulgation of personal income tax Year or “None”





7 For the following cases, what is the likelihood that a firm in a non-strategic sector with1000
employees in one location would receive financial assistance from the state if its liquidity
problems would necessitate plant closure?
a The firm is a state-owned enterprise





No. Item Possible response 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
8 Year of tax administration creation and
period(s) of comprehensive reform
Place “X” for relevant years
9 Period of comprehensive civil service
reform








10 What is the main reason preventing
better tax compliance?
1=poor (legally weak) tax law, 2= no political will, 3=poor staff training, 4=lack of
resources, 5= inadequate information systems, 6=ineffective courts, 7=corruption,
8=excess taxation
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Section H: Objectives
PERFORMANCE
No. Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1 We are interested in alternative measures of population “well being”
over the transition period.
a Refrigerators purchased Number
b Vehicles purchased Number
c Televisions purchased Number
2 Provide scores from an existing household opinion survey regarding
household “well being”  (Indicate question in “Notes-respondent”)
To be provided by  in
“Notes-respondent”
3 Provide scores from existing household “attitude” surveys regarding
their interest/agreement with the items below.  (Indicate exact survey




d Entrepreneurship (or business)




No. Item Possible responses 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
4 After following the interview procedures in the sheet, “Notes-
HIID”,  indicate the prioirty (based on efforts, not results) the
government at the time placed on:
a Enterprise privatization (non-strategic sectors)
b Enterprise privatization (strategic sectors)
c Pre-privatization enterprise restructuring (non-strategic sectors)
d Stock market creation
e Judiciary reform
f Reform of tax code and administration





1=against, 2=not a priority,
3=low priority, 4=high
priority






1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998
5 Using the procedures in “Notes-HIID”,
indicate the degree of donor effort the
government received in each of the following.
(Score) Major donors (Score) Major donors (Score) Major donors (Score) Major donors
a Enterprise privatization (non-strategic sectors) (      ) (      ) (      ) (      )
b Enterprise privatization (strategic sectors) (      ) (      ) (      ) (      )
c Pre-privatization enterprise restructuring (non-
strategic sectors)
(      ) (      ) (      ) (      )
d Stock market creation (      ) (      ) (      ) (      )
e Judiciary reform (      ) (      ) (      ) (      )
f Reform of tax code and administration (      ) (      ) (      ) (      )
g Social safety net creation (worker severance
pay, unemployment insurance, etc.)
(      ) (      ) (      ) (      )










donors, list top two
and use
abbreviations (      ) (      ) (      ) (      )
